

INTO THE WHO OF THINGS: SPECULATIVE PRAGMATISM AND THE METHOD OF DRAMATIZATION

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Abstract What is at stake in the method of dramatization? And how does it concern speculative pragmatism, a post-deleuzian philosophical approach that builds on the work of Alfred N. Whitehead and William James and encompasses the work of illustrious contemporary thinkers such as Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway, Brian Massumi, Erin Manning, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Anna Tsing and, last but not least, Bruno Latour? In trying to answer these questions, one is quickly confronted with another, simpler and essential question around which revolves Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's method of dramatization: the decisive importance of the question "Who?" in an attempt to elaborate on an image of thought that veers away from the clear and distinct realm of representation, inherited from Descartes and prevailing throughout modernity, hinting instead toward ontogenetic processes of individuation to be spotted within modernism. Articulating at the very intersection of the speculative and the pragmatic, the question "who?" becomes a key entry point into the speculative pragmatist notions of activity and intensity, and into Latour's understanding of the inner narrativity of things in the age of the Anthropocene.

Keywords Method of dramatization, speculative pragmatism, Bruno Latour, philosophy of possessions, Gilles Deleuze.

Everything must be interpreted as intensity.
Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*

My first concern in this essay consists in retracing in modern and contemporary philosophy what, starting with Nietzsche, has been called "method of dramatization" as a means to

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embody philosophical ideas in a more worldly, materialistic and, I should add, speculative way. I think that this “method” has to do not only with a range of modern and contemporary thinkers I’ve been directly working with (Brian Massumi or Isabelle Stengers, for instance), but also with new ways of understanding the role of literature and characterizing more-than-human agencies in the age of the Anthropocene, following what Bruno Latour calls “charitable fictions” (2013: 15) as means for philosophy to come “down to earth”.¹

What is at stake in the method of dramatization? And how does it concern speculative pragmatism, a post-deleuzian philosophical approach that builds on the work of Alfred N. Whitehead and William James and encompasses the work of illustrious contemporary thinkers such as Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway, Brian Massumi, Erin Manning, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Anna Tsing and, last but not least, Bruno Latour? In trying to answer these questions, one is quickly confronted with another, simpler and properly essential question around which revolves Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s method of dramatization: the decisive importance of the question “Who?”, in an attempt to elaborate on an image of thought that veers away from the clear and distinct realm of representation, inherited from Descartes and prevailing throughout modernity, hinting instead toward ontogenetic processes of individuation to be spotted within modernism.

The context in which I encountered this question is, I believe, meaningful in itself, as it redoubles and reflexively enriches its inherent dramatizing impulse. Indeed, my attention was brought to the question “who?” during a collective reading session of Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and philosophy* at SenseLab in the Spring of 2014, a speculative pragmatist research-creation lab co-founded by Erin Manning and Brian Massumi at Concordia University (Montreal, Canada). At the time, I had recently been hired as a researcher or “free radical,” as part of SenseLab’s *Immediation project*, a partnership grant that focused on generating occasions – or rather, *events* – of co-learning as a way to explore how research-creation generates new forms of transdisciplinary knowledge. I had just moved back to Montreal after spending two years as a post-doc at the Université Libre de Bruxelles in the GECO (Groupe d’études constructivistes), under the supervision of Isabelle Stengers. Part of this article is about staging the friendly yet dramatic contrast between these two major hubs of speculative pragmatist thinking.

At first glance, the question “who?” may seem outdated, particularly within the context of a theory of immediation that insists on emergent ecological relationscape. Following the tenants of vital materialism or immanent realism, this theory aspires, among other things, to heighten our sensitivity to the presence of impersonal affects circulating between beings. As Deleuzians and post-Deleuzians, are we not inclined to turn our attention to the indeterminacy and potential that reside in the blissful immanence of *a* life? Could there be a risk of humanist regression, or even worse, a tendency toward discrimination and exclusion that runs counter to an inclusive and ecosophical approach to the arts of belonging-in-becoming, subtly embedded in every question of “Who?” Doesn’t the “Who?” question spontaneously activate a

¹ Bruno Latour, *Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018.

possessive subject and imply an inclination toward appropriation that needs to be warded off and overcome?

In the lines that follow, I propose to briefly – and somewhat disorderly – present the method of dramatization in Nietzsche as interpreted by Deleuze in his *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and, further developed for his own purposes, in *Difference and Repetition*. The aim is to demonstrate how the question “Who?” articulates at the very intersection of the speculative and the pragmatic, and literally “imports” or matters – first and foremost for the making of active or living persons, in the non-anthropological sense given to it by Alfred N. Whitehead.² The speculative pragmatist concern for bare activity³ is closely related to Latour’s understanding of the inner narrativity of things in the age of the Anthropocene, and in the characterization of Gaia in the first place. Indeed, as he explains in what, arguably, is to be considered one of his most important articles, *Agency at the Time of the Anthropocene* (2014), and incidentally published in a journal of literary theory whose editor-in-chief at the time was Rita Felski, one of the few latourians inside literary studies, “storytelling is not just a property of language, but one of the many consequences of being thrown in a world that is, by itself, fully articulated and active.”⁴ It is in this sense that, insofar as it is composed of meaningful and active agents – “as long as they act, agents have meaning”⁵ – *the world for Bruno Latour is inherently dramatic*. In free dialogue with the pragmatist philosophy of possessions developed by Isabelle Stengers and various thinkers and practitioners who participated in the *Speculative Gestures* conference at Cerisy in 2013, where Latour presented this article as a work in progress, I will further inquire into how the question “Who?” and the inner narrativity of things relates to practices of active characterization. This exploration delves close to Jamesian and Whiteheadian theism, as well as an ecology of warring practices.

Please bear with the fragmentary and accelerated nature of the following reflection. It is first and foremost an attempt at sharing, in the form of a cartographic overview, a journey of inquiry and co-learning that may also prove to be a form of radical pedagogy, in the hope that, despite the impetuosity of the gesture of intercession thus sketched out, a few inflections and refreshed elements of thought will emerge, providing a foundation for future inquiries.

² “In the case of the higher animals there is central direction, which suggests that in their case *each animal body harbours a living person, or living persons*. Our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as such persons. (...) All the life in the body is the life of the individual cells. There are thus millions upon millions of centres of life in each animal body. *So what needs to be explained is not dissociation of personality but unifying control*, by reason of which we not only have unified behaviour, which can be observed by others, but also consciousness of a unified experience.” Alfred N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978 [1929]), 107-8; emphasis added.

³ Brian Massumi, *Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

⁴ Bruno Latour, “Agency at the Time of the Anthropocene,” *New literary History* Vol. 45, N. 1 (2014): 14.

⁵ Latour, “Agency,” 12.

1. *Mutual inclusion*. Erin Manning's *Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance* (2013) opens with a prelude written by Brian Massumi. There, Massumi highlights the reciprocal presupposition of the one and the many that underlies Manning's processual philosophy, based on an analysis of a key passage from Whitehead's *Process and Reality*:

[The term one] stands for the general idea underlying alike the indefinite article "a" or "an," and the definite article "the," and the demonstrative "this" or "that," and the relatives "which or what or how." *It stands for the singularity of an event.* The term "many" presupposes the term "one," and the term "one" presupposes the term "many."⁶

Massumi shows how Manning's thinking around individuation takes the question literally "from the middle." Building her argument on the processual openness of a plural "what else?" she revokes any form of moral judgment that might justify exclusionary practices. This is all the more crucial given that in *Always More Than One*, Manning explores an autistic mode of perception, which provides an opportunity to question and broaden the perceptive habits of "neurotypicals." This position resonates closely with Massumi's insistence on the potential for *mutual inclusion* that resides in the qualitative difference or "how" of the event, a mannerist ethos actively cultivated within the SenseLab.⁷ The ethos of belonging-in-becoming and mutual inclusion is therefore indistinguishable from the manner or "how" of the event. In keeping with Whitehead's concept of general idea, Massumi explains:

Whitehead's general idea stretches all the way from "the" to "how." In other words, it is a span of modal variation, a range of kinds or degrees of definiteness inflected by differences in manner ("how"). *Although it is all about definiteness, it is not about mutual exclusion.* Without the hierarchy of the "the" over the "a," there is no a priori way of ensuring non-contradiction. This is a logic of mutual *inclusion*: a logic for the many's "underlying" belonging-together.⁸

The challenge for both Manning and Massumi is to devise a logic of mutual inclusion that preserves its capacity for sharpness, or rather definiteness⁹, *i.e.*, a concept of mutual inclusion

⁶ Latour, "Agency," ix; emphasis added.

⁷ The concept of mutual inclusion is the central axis of the vitalist politics of play and animality elaborated by Massumi in his essay *What Animals Teach Us about Politics* (Duke, 2014). "The continuum on which instinct and intuition differ by *degrees* is that of animal bodying. The remix in which they come-together-again across their difference in *kind* recurs punctually in animal bodying's every gestured event. There is a one-word synonym for differential mutual inclusion: life," 34.

⁸ Erin Manning, *Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), xv; emphasis added.

⁹ Whitehead's *Religion in the Making* contains a clarification of the notion of definiteness which, without being contradictory, contrasts rather sharply with Massumi's emphasis on potentiality and inclusion

that resists giving way to indistinct commonality. Another word for it would be radical mannerism¹⁰, from which emerges an ethics founded on the inclusive potential of the “more than” constitutive of perceptual experience understood as event. It also gives rise to a *politics of potentiality*, whose effects are quite distinct, as we will go on to investigate, from a *politics of the possible* as defined in Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitical perspective, which is the bearer of *speculative gestures* committed by and for a possible to be activated in the present: “What we need to activate today is a thinking that commits to a possible, by means of resisting the probable.”¹¹ For now, it suffices to say that SenseLab’s insistence on the relational potential for inclusion is one of its most decisive ethical-political inflections, and it thoroughly conditions the way in which the question “Who?” may (or may not) be understood and acknowledged. Consequently, Manning’s concept of the relational potential of the event culminates in a celebration of the vitality affect that animates and runs through *a* life. As Massumi points out:

Process philosophy is how we burst with life, in and of the world. It’s about our worlding. (...) Manning’s word for the singular generic burstability of life a-worlding across the scales is “a” life (a term adopted from Deleuze). “A” life does not exclude the “this” and the “that” and the “which” and the “what” and the “how.” It doesn’t even exclude the “the.” Emphasizing the “a” is a way of saying that the “the” is not the categorical “The” but the potential for definiteness that comes of the processual mutual inclusion of the definite with the indefinite article, the demonstrative and the relative.¹²

Following Deleuze’s footsteps closely, Massumi shows how the indefinite article “a” is the index of the transcendental field. There, “the life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens.”¹³ But how does such a celebration of the overflowing vitality of an anonymous life and its potential for radical inclusion align with the Nietzschean-inspired method of dramatization and its particularly

when discussing the problem of the one and the multiple. “The essence of depth of actuality – that is the vivid experience – is definiteness. Now to be definite always means that all the elements of a complex whole contribute to some one effect, *to the exclusion of others*. The creative process is a process of exclusion to the same extent as it is a process of inclusion” (2011), 99-100; emphasis added. It is significant, as we shall see later in this article, that Whitehead articulates this distinction in the context of a reflection on theism.

¹⁰ Sjoerd van Tuinen, *The Philosophy of Mannerism: from Aesthetics to Modal Metaphysics* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022).

¹¹ Didier Debaise and Isabelle Stengers, “The Insistence of the Possibles: Toward a Speculative Pragmatism,” *Parse Journal*, Issue 7 (Autumn 2017): 18.

¹² Manning, *Always More Than One*, xvii-xviii.

¹³ Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence : a life...,” in *Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life* (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 28.

acute sense of selection? In the final pages of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze describes the Eternal Return as the “time of drama,” setting out a dazzling progression in which the potential freedom of “a” life is artfully contracted, so that “Difference may at last be expressed with a force of anger which is itself repetitive and capable of introducing the strangest selection, even if this is only a contraction here and there – in other words, a freedom for the end of a world.”¹⁴ More schematically, then: how does “a” life respond to the question “Who?” and its dramatizing tension? Doesn't every dramatization imply, to one degree or another, a process of personalization or personification?¹⁵

2. Winter 2013, Brussels, GECO (Groupe d'Études Constructivistes) reading group. We read Deleuze's *Foucault*. Dark contrast, obscure gesture, disquieting strangeness accentuated by the otherwise close speculative pragmatist alignment and proximity. During one of the reading sessions, Isabelle Stengers, in an inspired manner and with a zest of provocation, declares that Deleuze's “Immanence: a Life...,” which is widely regarded as his philosophical testament, constitutes an unfortunate mistake in Deleuze's trajectory, it leads astray. It is worth noting that, throughout the seminar, each occurrence of the term *dehors* (outside), around which the entire book's dramatic progression revolves, faces severe criticism. My own reading of Foucault in the key of anonymity (*Foucault anonymat*, Le Quartanier, 2012), is not so welcomed either.¹⁶ Stengers' entire ethical-philosophical effort, the meticulous explication of how heterogeneous elements within an arrangement (agencement) form a collective, is designed to protect us against the tendency to ecstatically merge differences into a fusion-in-common. This is undoubtedly one of the most valuable inflections of her work: it is about how important it is to resist a certain form of piety, as she likes to put it, even when it comes to Foucault or Deleuze... No doubt, my initiation into the philosophy of possessions had begun, even without my knowledge.

¹⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 293; emphasis added.

¹⁵ This question is aptly prefigured by Manning in her analysis of the film *Waltz with Bashir* (Ariel Folman, 2008). For more details, see chapter 3 of *Always More than One*, “Walzing the Limit.”

¹⁶ The contrast could not be starker with Massumi's fairly orthodox reading of Deleuze and Guattari in his *User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*: “The order-word of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is the anti-orderword of *the call of the outside*: listen closely for existential imperatives which, rather than limiting I and I's realm of virtuality, take it out of bounds.” In the very last lines of the book, Massumi explains how this call for the outside defies the limits of capitalism's private subjectivities and aims for new collective individuations: “Becomings are everywhere in capitalism, but they are always separated from their full potential, from the thing they need most to run their course: a population free for the mutating. (...) The way lies ahead, in taking the inventive potential released by capitalism so far that *we become so other as to no longer act in the perceived private interests of a separate Self* that we have in any case already ceased to be (if we ever were it). We must embrace our collectivity.” Brian Massumi, *User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1992), 41, 140-41; emphasis added.

3. *Philosophie des possessions* (Paris, 2011) is a major work that brings together philosophers such as David Lapoujade, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers to examine thinkers of the like of Gilbert Simondon, William James, Etienne Souriau, John Dewey, Alfred N. Whitehead and Gabriel Tarde. In the introduction, Didier Debaise, co-editor of the volume explains that

Our project, according to Tarde's proposal, can be summed up in one sentence: to replace classical ontology and the categories associated with it with a logic of possession. (...) The terms vary to express it: "capture," "predatio," "prehension," "take" or "appropriation," but basically, they all express the same operation, the same gesture, the one by which physical, biological, psychic or technical elements are integrated, captured by a being who makes them his own.¹⁷

Philosophie des possessions is an exceptionally rich book, charged with an undeniable programmatic power. One should not be fooled by the apparently conservative nature of the question of possession. On the contrary, the various contributions to the book multiply the ways in which the individual-owner can be defeated, remaining as close as possible to the fluctuating character of what it means for an individual to say that something is "mine."¹⁸ It is in this spirit that Debaise says that the book is about a world of captures to be actively contrasted with a world of (en)closures. This subtle but decisive contrast between captures and closures is first outlined in *The Fold*, where Deleuze discusses monadology in relation to mathematics: "Modern mathematics has been able to develop a fibered conception according to which 'monads' test the paths in the universe and enter in syntheses associated with each path. *It is a world of captures instead of closures*" (1992: 81, my emphasis).

At the end of her address to the colloquium on "Speculative gestures" in July 2013, at Cerisy, Stengers presented a suggestive geophilosophical image of thought that efficiently expresses the difference foregrounding the verb "to have" rather than "to be" makes in the philosophical realm. With provocative simplicity, she characterized the ancient Greeks as a "people of entrepreneurs." With this word, *entrepreneur*, she sought to convey the interplay of entangled holdings (*prises*) that calls for further collective ad-venturing, and the "bite of the possible" (*morsure du possible*) that persists in each one of them. But isn't it a perilous and rather biased decision to put philosophy under the sign of the enterprise? Do we not run the risk of losing something akin to an unconditional and unconditioned access to "being"? The image of the entrepreneurial people differs greatly from that of a group of wise, bearded, idle

¹⁷ Didier Debaise (ed.), *Philosophie des possessions* (Paris: Éditions du réel, 2011), 5.

¹⁸ "This is where the distinction established by Roman law between property and possession matters. Possession requires use, and is held only by use. The continuity of "I" depends on the use each thought makes of what precedes it. Isabelle Stengers, "William James. Naturalisme et pragmatisme au fil de la question de la possession," in *Philosophie des possessions*, Didier Debaise, ed., 47-48.

men contemplating the spherical perfection of being, as fabulated in fleshy terms in Sloterdijk's *Globes*, a primitive scene to which we are more accustomed.¹⁹

4. *Theater of forces*. Holds, takes, captures, prehensions, predations: the poetics of the philosophy of possessions suggests a natural, primal aggressiveness that echoes Nietzsche's pluralistic conception of forces and, in contrast to the animal politics of mutual inclusion and disparate potentials, is more inclined to detail the interplay of forces that cut, enlist, select and exclude. We find a succinct but decisive indication of this in Bruno Latour's preface to the re-edition of his early metaphysical treatise, *Irreductions*: "It's a question of moving on from the vertigo of power to the simple, banal positivity of forces."²⁰ One can easily see how the principle of irreducibility at the root of Latour's realist and agonist actor-network theory profoundly informs Harman's (overly) combative object-oriented ontology and many blogs that, in his wake, multiply doctrinal pronouncements and other polemical positionings, performing, in a way, the very ontological novelty they are after. Latour's idea of a theatre of forces and actors that measure, enlist, feel and put one another to proof (*s'éprouvent*) seems to be prefigured by this passage from Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy*:

The only true science is that of activity (...). "What is active? – reaching out for power" (VP I1 43/WP 657). Appropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating – these are the characteristics of active force. To appropriate means to impose forms, to create forms by exploiting circumstances (...). For Nietzsche, as for energetics, energy which is capable of transforming itself is called 'noble.' The power of transformation, the Dionysian power, is the primary definition of activity.²¹

The polemical relationship to the world (in the literal sense of *polemos*, war) that underlies Latour's cosmo-diplomatic project flows naturally from the idea of irreducibility. Latour's overarching problem is to account for "the stubborn determination of things to keep on existing."²² Following Whitehead's conception of the atomicity of becoming, he conceives of the fabric of the world itself as made of a myriad of actual occasions to be acknowledged and "revealed" as such. This represents, arguably, the core concern of Latour's *opus magnum*, *An Inquiry on the Modes of Existence* (AIME), in which he tirelessly reminds us of the "series of small *discontinuities* it is appropriate to pass in order to obtain a certain *continuity* of action."²³

¹⁹ It has been, if anything, a wonderful occasion to playfully recall this delicious Bushism: "The problem with the French is that they don't have a word for *entrepreneur*."

²⁰ Bruno Latour, "Préface de la nouvelle édition", in *Irreductions* (Paris: La découverte, 2001), 8 (my translation).

²¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 42.

²² Bruno Latour, *An Inquiry on the Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 141.

²³ Latour, *Inquiry*, 33.

Here are two exemplary Latourian dramatizations of the principle of irreduction: "Act as you wish, so long as this cannot be easily undone. As a result of the actants' work, certain things do not return to their

In that same vein, his practical concern, as well as his general poetics, veers toward the problem of institutionalization, or rather, following Etienne Souriau, that of *instauration*. Instauration is about staying with the joy and the trouble of bringing something new and durable to the world, and accepting to be transformed in the process. If anything, it hints at the challenges of establishing enduring arrangements while also welcoming the dionysian lability of forces. Note also that this concern for the institutional and instaurational is reflected in the title of the introduction and the conclusion of AIME: “Trusting Institutions Again?,” and “Can We Praise the Civilization to Come?.” Similarly, when Stengers seeks to honor the metamorphic power of agency and “reclaim animism,” her attention is focused first and foremost on the heterogeneity of the elements that enter in the composition, so as to avoid the temptation to think of the power of transformation “in general.”²⁴ In the end, it is not so much Dionysus’ dizzying powers of metamorphosis that Latour and Stengers are interested in, but the actual assemblages of masks he generates.

5. *Overcoming the proprietary ego*. The question “Who?” poses the problem of appropriation. In the fifth chapter of his book on Nietzsche, “The Overman: Against the Dialectic,” Deleuze reconstructs the post-Hegelian history of dialectics, and discusses in details Max Stirner’s decisive influence on Nietzsche’s conception of the overman. The allusion to the author of *The Unique and Its Property* is no doubt instrumental to Nietzsche’s argument. Here, in the voice of Zarathoustra: “The overman lies close to my heart, *he* is my paramount and sole concern – and *not* man: not the nearest, not the nearest, not the poorest, not the most suffering, not the best.”²⁵ Deleuze thus presents Stirner as the most extreme figure of dialectics, as the one who was able to “rediscover the path of the question: “which one?”²⁶, reveal nihilism as the truth of dialectics, and get rid of the abstract concept of freedom:

“The conceptual question, ‘what is man?’ has then changed into the personal question ‘who is man?’. With ‘what’ the concept was sought for in order to realise it; with ‘who’ it is no longer any question at all, but the answer is personally on hand at

original state. A shape is set, like a crease. It can be called a trap, a ratchet, an irreversibility, a Maxwell’s demon, a reification. The exact word does not matter so long as it designates an asymmetry. Then you cannot act as you wish. There are winners and losers, there are directions, and some are made stronger than others.” Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 160. Or again: “But in love as in war all is fair in the attempt to attach the rules to something more durable than the moment that inspired them.” Latour, *Pasteurization*, 161.

²⁴ “When magic is reclaimed as an art of assemblage, assemblages, inversely, become a matter of empirical and pragmatic concern about effects and consequences, not of general consideration or textual dissertation. (...) *one is never animist “in general,”* always in the terms of an assemblage that produces or enhances metamorphic (magic) transformation in our capacity to affect and be affected—that is also to feel, think, and imagine.” Isabelle Stengers, “Reclaiming Animism,” in *E-Flux journal*, N.36 (2012).

²⁵ Quoted in Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 163.

²⁶ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 159.

once in the asker.” In other words, the posing of the question “who?” is sufficient to lead the dialectic to its true result: *saltus mortalis*. (...)

I have nothing against freedom but I wish you more than just freedom. You should be disencumbered of what you do not want, you should also possess what you do want, you should not only be a free man, you should also be a proprietor.²⁷

And it is immediately after these two quotes that Deleuze straightforwardly asks: “But who is appropriated or reappropriated? What is the reappropriating instance?”²⁸ The Nietzschean-Deleuzian response demands the overcoming of the proprietary ego, with all the natural aggressiveness and multi-faceted self-enjoyment of the Dionysian trickster-thinker.

6. Following these preliminary remarks, here is a series of excerpts from *Nietzsche and philosophy* that traces the implication of the “Who?” question in defining the method of dramatization.

I.

(...) one must venture the hypothesis that wherever ‘effects’ are recognised, will is operating on will.²⁹

Glose α: This quote is drawn from Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*. For the first time, it prefigures the centrality of the question “who?” – of “who?” as a principle of *active characterization* of something which is not “one”, neither a “person”. This pluralist ontology of will is often described as radical perspectivism. One author that has produced a substantial body of work directly inspired by this type of approach is the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. In *Cannibal Metaphysics* for instance, he goes to great length in describing how Western modernity has developed an objectivist epistemology in which “to know is to objectify by distinguishing between what is intrinsic to the object and what instead belongs to the knowing subject, which has been inevitably and illegitimately projected onto the object.”³⁰

In the light of this typically modern binomial epistemology of subject/object, we can say not only that Deleuze or Latour’s thinking has modernist features, but that, insofar as the who is always an intensity, there is a certain prose – from Virginia Woolf to Clarice Lispector – that is modernist precisely in that it opposes, reacts to modernity. We draw on a definition from Fredric Jameson, for whom modernism is “a reaction to that situation and that process

²⁷ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 159-160.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 160.

²⁹ Nietzsche quoted in Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 7.

³⁰ Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-Structuralist Anthropology* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2014), 60.

alike” which is precisely “modernity, as the new historical situation.”³¹ The new anthropology of Viveiros de Castro can be read as a similar reaction within a field less indebted to Cartesian epistemology. In probably too elegant of a (post)structuralist conceptual symmetry, he goes on to contrast this epistemology with the shamanic mode of knowledge of the indigenous people of the Amazon. If for Western modern epistemology, “the form of the Other is the thing,” writes Viveiros de Castro,

Amerindian shamanism is guided by the inverse ideal: to know is to “personify,” to take the point of view of what should be known or, rather, the one whom should be known. The key is to know, in Guimaraes Rosa’s phrase, “the who of things,” without which there would be no way to respond intelligently to the question of “why.” The form of the Other is the person.³²

Knowing the who of things doesn’t only apply to the relatively exotic realm of Amazonian shamanism. In closer proximity with modern epistemology, yet on its periphery, one can also think of the therapeutic practice of the Egypt-born French ethnopsychiatrist Tobie Nathan, who aims at transforming the patient in witness as part of a cosmos-oriented healing process. For Tobie Nathan, no metamorphosis is possible without mediating “beings” to which we can attach ourselves. This conception of therapeutic transformation deeply informs Bruno Latour’s “being of metamorphosis,” as presented in his *Inquiry on the Modes of Existence*. During the “Speculative Gestures” encounter organized by Isabelle Stengers and Didier Debaise, where Viveiros de Castro was also among the keynote speakers, Nathan forcefully explained that a being is *a thing whose intention has been identified*. In Nathan’s ethnopsychiatric clinical practice, the metamorphic power of therapeutic arrangement depends on the ability to actively characterize “wills.” One could therefore say that Tobie Nathan’s method of pluralist dramatization aims for the generalized activation of psyches according to an investigative and perspectivist logic of possessions.

II.

“What is it? I cried out with curiosity – which one is it? you ought to ask! Thus spoke Dionysus, then kept quiet in his own special way, that is to say, in an enticing way.” According to Nietzsche, the question “which one?” means this: what are the forces which take hold of a given thing, *what is the will that possesses it?* Which one is expressed, manifested and even hidden in it? We are led to essence only by the question: which one? (...) Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a

³¹ Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity. Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London: Verso, 2013), 99.

³² Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 60-61.

plurality. Fundamentally it is always the question “What is it for me?” (for us, for everyone that sees etc.)³³

And so the question “which one?” reverberates in and for all things: which forces, which will? This is the *tragic* question. At the deepest level the whole of it is held out to Dionysus. For Dionysus is the god who hides and reveals himself (...) The question “which one?” finds its supreme instance in Dionysus or in the will to power; Dionysus, the will to power, is the one that answers it each time it is put. (...) Dionysus is the god of transformations, the unity of multiplicity, the unity that affirms multiplicity and is affirmed of it. “Which one is it?” – it is always him. This is why Dionysus keeps tantalisingly quiet: to gain time to hide himself, to take another form and to change forces.³⁴

Glose β: Dionysus, characterized as “the one who affirms the multiple,” aligns with the reciprocal presupposition of the one and the multiple highlighted by Massumi in relation to Whitehead’s concept of “general ideas.” However, this characterization adds a temporal and properly dramatic dimension – “the time to hide” – to this processual logic, thematizing the practical element of difference as pragmatics of seduction. Nietzsche’s characterization of Dionysus is thus articulated at the juncture of the speculative and practical planes: “The affirmation of multiplicity is the speculative proposition, just as the joy of diversity is the practical proposition.”³⁵

In the final analysis, Nietzsche’s question, “Who?,” leads to the active indetermination of Dionysus and the will to power, creatively overcoming the proprietary self. It is in close alignment with this general movement of thought of the “virtue that gives” beyond the pre-constituted subject that Erin Manning can write, in apparent contradiction with the foregrounding of the question “who?”: “Nietzsche’s will to power is often misunderstood as the force of an individual will. This misunderstanding turns the will into the volitional act of a preexisting subject.”³⁶ For Manning, what is at stake in Nietzsche’s will to power is the transformative and eventful movement of affirmative difference, how it “activates the field of relation by shifting its relations of power.”³⁷ Manning thus translates the unfathomable impulse of the seductive and mysterious Dionysus into the language of relational ontogenetics. This affirmation of the radical impersonality of the relational field undoubtedly resides at the opposite end of the Deleuzo-Nietzschean interpretative spectrum, particularly when contrasted with Latour’s insistence on the actual plurality (and “banal positivity”) of forces. There would need to be a whole analysis of how this affirmation of the impersonality of the

³³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 77; emphasis added.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 197.

³⁶ Erin Manning, *The Minor Gesture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 207.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 207.

relational field in the context of the SenseLab is indissociable from a pervasive charismatic recentering of said relational field around the choreographic gesture of Manning herself – a role that has been experimented with and formalized, in the best of Dionysian fashions, as that of “goddess of anarchy.” This creative affirmation of the impersonal and transversal dimensions of what gets often referred to as *the event* generates very real effects. It is indeed the actual conceptual basis of a truly wonderful (if at times, cultish) ethic of speculative generosity practiced in and through the SenseLab, defining its “noble” and highly metamorphic way of inheriting Nietzsche and nurturing its horizon of futurity.³⁸

III.

From this form of question there derives a method. Any given concept, feeling or belief will be treated as symptoms of a will that wills something. What does *the one that* says this, that thinks or feels that, will? It is a matter of showing that he could not say, think or feel this particular thing if he did not have a particular will, particular forces, a particular way of being. (...) This method corresponds to the tragic question. It is itself the tragic method. Or, more precisely, if we remove from the word “drama” all the Christian and dialectical pathos which taints it, it is the method of *dramatization*. (...)

We must not be deceived by the expression: *what* the will wants. What a will wants is not an object, an objective or an end. (...) Thus, when we ask: “what does the one who thinks this want?” we do not abandon the fundamental question “which one?,” we merely give it a rule and a methodical development. We are demanding that the question be answered not by *examples* but by the determination of a *type*.³⁹

Glose γ: Nietzsche’s method of dramatization is an art of typological and differential interpretation and evaluation. The question “Who?” affirms a qualitative difference and refers

³⁸ For a SenseLab collective exploration around the concept of futurity, see the text written collectively at the invitation of the Montreal Biennale of Contemporary Art 2014, “The Present Feeling: Contemporary Art and the Question of Time.” In *Nietzsche Apostle*, Peter Sloterdijk describes, in a way that intimately reflects the ethopoietic aims of the SenseLab, the arc of speculative generosity and the “provocative” effects it produces: “Nobility is a position with respect to the future. Nietzsche’s innovative gift consists in provoking one to engage in a way of being in which the receiver would take up an active force as sponsor, that is to say, in the ability to open up richer futures. Nietzsche is a teacher of generosity in the sense that he infects the recipients of his gifts with the idea of wealth, which is necessarily not worth acquiring unless with a view to being able to squander it. (...) Erupting from the motive of “virtuous giving” is a spring of pluralism leading beyond all expectations of unity. The nature of provocative generosity is such that it is unable to be alone and wants even less to be so.” Peter Sloterdijk, *Nietzsche Apostle* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(s), 2013), 58-59, 62.

³⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 78-79.

to an “original” figure (*typos*), or rather, following the idea of genealogy, an origin, something like a paradigmatic type, always in the process of being established, instaurated. In every situation, in each thing, it is a matter of identifying and characterizing an internal, qualified genetic principle – of dramatization as the art of discerning *differences that matter*. It is about thinking in terms of types or figures that determine a new image of thought.

For if Nietzsche is a thinker who dramatizes ideas, it is insofar as he proceeds by mobilizing affects: a psychodrama of thought in which ideas are presented as “successive events, at various levels of tension,”⁴⁰ to reveal the uneven topology of the *pathos* beneath each *logos*. The dramatization method thus acts as a staging and revealing process of forces that often remain hidden beneath the representations. It challenges the ideal of disinterested truth addressed to anyone and everyone: the radical perspectivism inherent in the “who?” question compels us to activate localized and situated ways of putting oneself at stake – a “who” that succeeds in making its expressive, vibrant materiality felt.⁴¹ Indeed, Nietzsche, the “thinker on stage” as Peter Sloterdijk aptly characterized him in a book entitled so, does not believe in things or subjects, but in qualified actions (remember that the Greek word for *drama* precisely means “action”); and he would also turn away from a flat ontology which, in the name of greater objectivity, operates according to a generalized principle of humiliation and disqualification.⁴²

But what about the relationship between the qualitative difference called for by the “Who?” question and the personalization and characterization process it suggests? Of course, the method of dramatization refers to all individuation processes and not just to humans. In this sense, it applies to the most varied forms of inter-possession, from Whitehead’s “societies of molecules” to “organisms that person” the world, as the speculative architects Arakawa and Gins so suggestively put it. One here might also think of Latour’s approach to the personalizing

⁴⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche par Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: PUF, 1965), 38; my translation.

⁴¹ In this context, the vibrant materiality (see Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matters*) of “new materialisms” would require its own careful problematization. New materialists often tend towards a mode of ontological dramatization that gives free rein to the academic affirmation of the abstract truth of the “posthuman,” which is content to play off the truth of non- or post- or more-than-human perspectives in general against the presupposed humanism of the uninitiated. For a scathing critique of the irenicism of the new materialisms and their propensity for “ontological enlightenment,” see Christian Thorne, “To the Political Ontologists” (2013).

⁴² A similar effect of flattening and deskilling is at play in the name “Anthropocene.” As Donna Haraway pointed out at the above-mentioned *Speculative Gestures* Cerisy conference, “the Anthropocene manager never asks “Who?” The discriminating “Who?” to which Haraway appeals carries with it plural storytelling powers that complicate (and politicize) the great geocratic fable of the Anthropocene, which addresses an abstract humanity and standardized species. On this question, see Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, *L'événement Anthropocène. La Terre, l'histoire et nous* (Seuil, 2013). This book offers a critical reading of the standard Anthropocene narrative. For the authors, the question is anything but theoretical, because every narrative describing “how did we get here?” generates a perspective from which stems, again and again, renewed, “and what to do now?”

modes of figuration of *Gaia* and the kind of arts of narration to be fostered in the age of the Anthropocene. In his criticism of how, in the “scientific worldview,” “the agency of all the entities making up the world has been made to vanish”⁴³, Latour reminds us that we shouldn’t leave aside the literary and historical dimension inherent to any attempt to weave “the various threads of geostory.”⁴⁴ Closely aligned to Haraway’s call for great enough narratives for our time, Latour insists: “The great paradox of the ‘scientific worldview’ is to have succeeded in *withdrawing historicity* from the world. And with it, of course, the inner *narrativity* that is part and parcel of being in the world – or, as Donna Haraway prefers to say, ‘with the world’.”⁴⁵ The decision to address the Anthropocene through the mythical figure of Gaia is a key example of a speculative pragmatist method of dramatization if there is one.⁴⁶

Glose δ: Reappropriating on his own terms the Nietzschean method of dramatization, Deleuze explains, in key pages of *Difference and Repetition*, how the method concerns spatio-temporal dynamisms and their *intensive* processes of individuation: “Individuation is what responds to the question ‘Who?’, just as the Idea responds to the questions ‘How much?’ and ‘How?’. ‘Who?’ is always an intensity.”⁴⁷ For Deleuze, ultimately, the method of dramatization is indistinguishable from the problem of individuation:

“The great discovery of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which marks his break with Schopenhauer and goes under the name of the will to power or the Dionysian world, is the following: no doubt the I and the Self must be replaced by an undifferentiated abyss, but this abyss is neither an impersonal nor an abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the contrary, it is the I and the self which are the abstract universals. They must be replaced, but in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors which consume them and which constitute the fluid world of Dionysus. What cannot be replaced is individuation itself.”⁴⁸

This is not the place to discuss in detail Deleuze’s own way of developing and reclaiming the method of dramatization. That would entail a discussion on the relationship between Idea and concept, the virtual and the actual, extending to the distinctly dramatic role of the dark precursors for the Eternal Return. What interests me more here is not so much a speculative description of the ontogenetic plane where intensities enter resonant and generative

⁴³ Latour, “Agency,” 13.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁶ For a deeper analysis of this question, see my “Bruno Latour and the Miraculous Power of Enunciation,” in *Breaking the Spell: Contemporary Realism under Discussion*, Anna Longo, ed. (Paris, Mimesis international, 2015).

⁴⁷ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 246; emphasis added.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 258.

relationships, but rather to characterize in greater details the practical difference introduced by the individuating power of the “Who?” at the edge of “personalization.” As we have discussed it earlier, the method of dramatization implies a typological or imaginal dimension⁴⁹ which, following the example of Nietzsche’s work, requires an attentive relationship to modes of subjectivation. For Nietzsche did not merely criticize the interplay of active and reactive forces leading to the impasses of nihilism and resentment; he actively inscribed the subject’s autogenesis on the philosophical agenda and multiplied observations on ways to exacerbate life and creatively sustain contrasts. Nietzsche, the thinker on stage, enacts a drama of truth that exposes, more than ever (if we are to take seriously the megalomaniacal declarations of *Ecce homo*), the perils of enunciation. It is in direct and practical relation to the ethopoietic, aesthetic and political configurations that activate our relationship to the world and *the courage of truth* that the problem of meaning and personalization arises.⁵⁰

In a quite astonishing passage from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze gives voice to a Greco-Nietzschean ethic of counter-effectuated cruelty which clearly poses the problem of the imagination-that-personifies. After establishing the need to give meaning to pain in order to sustain oneself in existence, Deleuze writes:

“In order for pain to be judged from an active point of view it must be kept in the element of its exteriority. There is a whole art in this, an art which is that of the masters. The masters have a secret. They know that pain has only one meaning: giving pleasure to someone, giving pleasure to someone who inflicts or contemplates pain. If the active man is able not to take his own pain seriously it is because he always imagines someone to whom it gives pleasure. It is not for nothing that such an imagination is found in the belief in the active gods which peopled the Greek world.”⁵¹

This example is edifying in more ways than one and proves to be an extremely important ethopoietic indication. By revealing the technical “secret” of the Greek masters in establishing a free and ethical relationship with their own suffering, Deleuze simultaneously shows the

⁴⁹ In fact, the gap that opens between the domain of the speculative and that of the dramatic closely parallels the gap between thought and imagination, observed by Deleuze: “While it is thought which must explore the virtual down to the ground of its repetitions, it is imagination which must grasp the process of actualisation from the point of view of these echoes or reprises.” Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 220.

⁵⁰ In his seminar *L’antiphilosophie de Nietzsche* (Nietzsche’s Antiphilosophy), held in 1992-1993 at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, Badiou discusses something very relevant to these questions through the role and function of proper names in Nietzsche’s work: “In reality, to understand Nietzsche is, fundamentally, to understand the function of proper nouns. To use Deleuzian lexicon, Nietzsche’s thought is a philosophy of conceptual characters, who carry along and concentrate the crucial points of Nietzsche’s thought apparatus,” <http://www.entretiens.asso.fr/Badiou/92-93.htm>.

⁵¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 129-130.

fabulatory component of any active existence – something like an art of divine disjunctions. We already know how important the concept of fabulation will become in Deleuze's subsequent work, especially his books on cinema. One can also already sense in this passage

the idea that, in order to express oneself, one has to fabricate her own intercessors; and one could even detect here, in incipient form, what will later on be thematized as the necessity to believe in the world. But beyond the potential prefigurations of key ideas in the Deleuzian trajectory, what is striking about this description of an active, fictionalized relationship to suffering is that it suggests difference can only be fully exacerbated, and exteriority can only be fully deployed, under the guise of a personalized will – in this case, that of gods rejoicing in the spectacle of cruelty that is both personalized and personalizing. It is as if the genetic principle of what fabricates us as *persons* were thus revealed. And beware of those who fail to pay attention to the extreme ambivalence that underlies this crucial technical term within the Christian and juridical tradition, and which has almost succeeded in making us forget, under the weight of its moral substantiality, the light and versatile soul that originates itself as *persona* and mask...⁵²

Glose ε: Those who pursue this type of pragmatist interrogation (pragmatist in the sense of a concern for staying with the consequences and effects) on the deistic side of the question of “Who?” that individuate and personifies cannot fail to encounter William James and Alfred North Whitehead on their way. I will confine myself here to a few brief notes – the subject undoubtedly merits a more thorough and systematic development.⁵³ Isabelle Stengers has brilliantly highlighted the importance of the question of God in both James and Whitehead. In her article on James in *Philosophie des possessions*, she poses a classic pragmatist question with great ethopoetic implications: The question at the heart of William James's theism seems to me to be: “which God is likely, today, to bring into existence saints who are those of our time and not living relics?”⁵⁴ Discussing William James's essay *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, first published at the turn of the 20th century, Stengers believes that “the urgency that we need to make felt is the impossibility of reducing to a simple problem of knowledge

⁵² It is, among other things, against this backdrop that the birth (and decline) of tragedy finds its full intelligibility: “Tragedy dies at the same time as drama becomes an inward conflict and suffering is internalised. But who invents and wills the internal meaning of pain? (...) The Christian-priest brings bad conscience out of its raw animal state, he presides over the internalisation of pain.” Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 130-131.

⁵³ See Erik Bordeleau, “Immediation, Bergson and the Problem of Personality,” in *Immediations: Art, Media, Event*, A. Munster, E. Manning and B. Thomsen, eds. (Open Humanities Press, 2019).

⁵⁴ Didier Debaise and Isabelle Stengers, “The Insistence of the Possibles,” 67.

In a way very much compatible with Latour's insistence on the small discontinuities at work in the making of any continuity, Stengers' reading of William James' work highlights James' “vital character of effort.” Significantly, and in line with the kind of contrast I've been trying to articulate in this essay, Erin Manning, in the chapter “Carrying the Feeling” of *The Minor Gesture* (2016), focuses instead on what James says about the question of effortlessness in relation to (dis)inhibition.

the confidence that makes us feel that ‘the possible exceeds the real’.”⁵⁵ What seems to me decisive here is that, for James, the personal form of theism is the most apt to make felt a sense of the possible capable of sustaining an active existence. As in the example of the Greek gods, what is at stake here is a clear definition of exteriority that only “personality” seems able to ensure:

Now, what are these essential features? First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. (...) But, extrinsically considered, so to speak, *God’s personality is to be regarded, like any other personality, as something lying outside of my own and other than me*, and whose existence I simply come upon and find. (...) If infratheistic ways of looking on the world leave it in the third person, a mere *it*; and if theism turns the *it* into a *thou*, — so we may say that these other theories try to cover it with the mantle of the first person, and to make it a part of *me*.⁵⁶

The problem is posed in rather similar yet more abstract terms in the work of Alfred N. Whitehead. It is against a cosmological background that Whitehead ponders the merits of a theistic personalist order. In *Religion in the Making*, for example, he writes: “The extremes are the doctrines of God as the impersonal order of the universe, and the doctrine of God as the one person creating the universe.”⁵⁷ His preference seems to be for the personalist option (even if he clearly distances himself from actually existing Christian theology) because, in his opinion, it better integrates the eminently factual-actual problem of evil in its historical contingency; and above all, because it fosters a sense of what he calls “active personality”:

Buddhism is a metaphysic generating a religion. In respect to its treatment of evil, Christianity is more inclusive of the facts. It derives the evil from the contingent fact of the actual course of events; it thus allows of an ideal as conceivable in terms of what is actual. Buddhism, on the whole, discourages the sense of active personality, whereas Christianity encourages it.⁵⁸

In her monumental *Thinking with Whitehead*, Stengers takes a closer look at the evolution of the concept of God in Whitehead’s thought. In a development that has been added to the English translation of the work, she poses the problem of how Whitehead inherits James’s theism in these terms:

⁵⁵ Didier Debaise and Isabelle Stengers, “The Insistence of the Possibles,” 66.

⁵⁶ William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/26659-h.htm>; emphasis added.

⁵⁷ Alfred N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1927]), 135.

⁵⁸ Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, 125.

Whitehead presents himself as the philosopher who comes after William James. It is thus permissible to wonder to what extent Whitehead is not also the heir to James's God. (...) If the speculative God, derived from the adventure of rationality, is not able to satisfy the vital need that James's God answered, how does Whitehead inherit this need? (...) *For me, it is crucial that Whitehead did not speak of his God as a person or a personality*, and that the reversal of the physical and mental poles suppresses any possible relation of consanguinity between him and us.⁵⁹

The relationship between theism and active personality deserves a deeper inquiry, investigating, for example, how Bergson thematizes the effort to be a person; or how Latour conceives of religion as the "fabrication of people made close again"⁶⁰, or suggests that the eco-theo-logical name of Gaia might induce the Moderns in more grounded and adapted ways to engage in and with the new climate regime. The "who" question leads not only to restating the question of subjectivity in an age of more-than-human agencies, but also to thinking about new practices of writing and other forms of artistic display of ideas that are both creative and more responsive to our times. In the end, the intention here was simply to show how the "who?" that personalizes is the crucible of a formidable theoretical and practical contrast at the intersection of active characterization and mutual inclusion, practices embodied in the most stimulating fashion in the friendly polarization between Latour, Stengers, and the philosophers of possession on the one hand, and Massumi, Manning, and the SenseLab on the other.

Da capo al Coda

*In a field
I am the absence of field.
This is always the case.
Where I am
I am what is missing.
When I walk
I part the air*

*And always
The air moves in
To fill the space
Where my body's been.
We all have reasons
For moving.
I move
To keep things whole.
(Marc Strand, *Keeping Things Whole*).*

⁵⁹ Isabelle Stengers, "William James. Naturalisme et pragmatisme au fil de la question de la possession," in *Philosophie des possessions*, Didier Debaise, ed. (Paris: Éditions du réel, 2011), 491-492; emphasis added.

⁶⁰ Latour, *Inquiry*, 98.

This key formulation is quite hard to translate in English. In French, the expression goes: "la fabrication de personnes remises en presence" (Latour, *Jubiler – ou les tourments de la parole religieuse*, 2002, 185), which would roughly translates as: "the fabrication of people brought back into presence."