The Five-Star Movement in Parliament: 
a Truly New Kind of Parliamentary Opposition?

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Introduction

The Five-Star Movement (5SM) is a fitting example of the "new opposition" anticipated by Mair (2011) arising in the context of the crisis of mainstream parties and, more generally, of representative institutions. It is an anti-establishment opposition that presents itself as an alternative to all the political forces and does not identify with traditional cleavages, especially the socio-economic distinction between left and right. Finally, it is strongly opposed to mainstream party elites, considering them the first responsible for the country’s poor economic performance and moral conditions (De Giorgi 2016). At the same time, unlike Mair’s theorised actor, it is, or better aims to be only temporarily in opposition.

Reams of articles (academic and non-academic) have been written on this new eclectic protagonist in the Italian political scenario (for a recent book, see Tronconi 2015). These important studies have analysed the Movement from different perspectives, bringing under the lenses its communication strategy, organisational profile, charismatic leader and ideology. On the other hand, there is still little knowledge on the behaviour of its elected MPs in parliament (an exception is Pinto and Pedrazzani 2015). The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the Movement and, more in general, “new opposition” parties by analysing their agenda decisions in parliament, i.e. within one of the most criticised institutions by these parties. The focus will be on the kind of issues they decide to bring to the fore both in their legislative and government oversight activities. The end of their first legislative term is parliament in approaching and we argue that this issue-based perspective and the choice to look closer at this less publicised side of the 5SM activities (which is more well-known to the public for its town square rallies and media appearances) can lead to important insights into the progressive institutionalisation of the Movement. And maybe also to their next electoral campaign and elections results.

The analysis of this – for the time being – purely empirical research paper is set up in three parts. The first step entails a comparison of the Movement’s agenda with previous Opposition parties’ agendas. The goal is to analyse whether its issue attention profile overlaps more with parties of the left or the right side of the political spectrum. This way we can test whether the SSM lives up to its word of being
indifferent to the socio-economic cleavage. In the second step, we look at individual issues prioritised by the Movement both in its legislative and government oversight activities and compare them to the priorities of other opposition parties in the current legislature (17th legislature, which started in February 2013 and is still ongoing). The goal is to verify how different the Movement behaved in comparison with other parties and to what extent its opposition style was innovative. The third and last step considers the interaction between opposition agendas in parliament. We ask whether the Movement is more an agenda-setter or an agenda-receiver in the issue competition game within the opposition camp. Before presenting the results of the analysis, we provide a brief overview of the main features of the Movement as a “new” opposition party both outside and inside of Parliament.

The Five-Star Movement outside and inside the Parliament

In the context of the ongoing transformations in contemporary democracies, for once Italy is no exception, but rather the place where some of the trends observable in most of the European countries occur: the sharp drop in the governing parties’ level of support; the rise of new political forces, often anti-establishment and with a strongly populist rhetoric (Bosco and Verney 2012); and the increasing divide between parties that govern, but are no longer capable of representing, and parties that do not govern, but represent (Mair 2011). The 5 Star Movement constitutes, within this context, an excellent case of the latter parties, that is, the "new opposition". Of course, being in parliament for the first time since 2013, their non-governing position/opposition status could just be a temporary and not permanent characteristic.

After years in which we thought that the bipolar asset of the party competition in Italy had become a consolidated reality, the Movement led by Beppe Grillo contributed to subverting the Italian party system, presenting itself, for the first time, at the 2013 election as a third force alternative to both poles. At that election, riding the wave of the unpopularity that had affected all the governing parties, the SSM obtained the 25.6 percent of the votes in the Chamber of Deputies, vis-à-vis the 25.4 of the Democratic Party (PD) and 21.6 of the People of Freedom (PDL). It was from all points of view an extraordinary result (Vegetti et al., 2013). A party at its first electoral competition gathered a level of consensus equal, when not superior, to that of the two mainstream parties from the centre right and centre left. Only thanks to the electoral system, which rewarded the winning coalition and not the winning party, the centre-left Democratic Party (PD) obtained a majority prize in seats, succeeding in overtaking the SSM in the Chamber of Deputies (D'Alimonte 2013).

Since its founding in 2009 by the comedian, activist and blogger Beppe Grillo and the entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio, the SSM has been a fierce critic of the delegation principle on which political representation is based. In their view, it inevitably leads to the betrayal of the citizens’ will. From an
organisational point of view, the movement follows a horizontal model. They defend that this same model should be applied to Italian political institutions through an increasing recourse to direct democracy and the exploitation of internet capabilities, especially social networks. Being connected (with its non-accidental double meaning) with the citizens through the network is considered by its founders as one of the essential tools to reform the model of representative democracy from the bottom. It is the only effective means through which citizens can keep control of their representatives and avoid the risk of being "betrayed". Thanks to its permanent connection with the citizens/voters – with whom the Movement is always in touch through Grillo’s blog and other major social media like Facebook and Twitter (Passarelli and Tuorto 2016) - the 5SM succeeded in politicising those issues perceived as more urgent by a considerable portion of voters but neglected by traditional parties (Conti and Memoli 2015) far in advance of the campaign for the general election. In this way, it was able to secure an enormous (somehow unexpected) consensus by occupying the space left by the mainstream governing parties.

Which were these issues? The first battles of Grillo and its supporters – from which a large part of the new parliamentary elite is derived – can be traced back to the so-called "new politics" (Poguntke 1987, 1989). The key themes, at the origin of the movement, concerned primarily environmentalism and renewable energy, issues of poverty and precarious work, battles against the power of large enterprises and the effects of globalisation, morality of politics, civil rights and, in particular, the guarantee of the access to specific services and, above all, to the internet by anyone (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015, p. 460).

Immediately after their entry into the parliamentary arena, the 5SM members of parliament (MPs) rushed to reveal their non-involvement into the old party dynamics. In particular, they denied their availability to post-electoral alliances which would have helped overcome the political paralysis that had hit the parliament (and the country) following the 2013 electoral results. The 5SM wanted to convey the image of a movement from the bottom, close to the citizens and far from the traditional party logics. Their goal was not to favour a resolution of the impasse, but rather to worsen it so that the “old” Italian politics could collapse and radically be transformed. Its MPs therefore appeared in the parliamentary arena as a "new opposition": an opposition that is alternative to all political forces – whether they come from the left or the right, from the majority or the (other) opposition –, with a strong will to conquer the majority of seats and the government in the near future.

Data and methods

The analysis presented in this paper relies on a newly collected data set resulting from the content-coding of parliamentary activities of MPs from the 5SM and the three main opposition parties: Go Italy
(FI, Forza Italia), Northern League (LN, Lega Nord) and Left, Ecology and Liberty (SEL, Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà)). The time frame includes the first two governments (Letta and Renzi) in the 17th legislature (from February 2013 to November 2016). To examine legislative activities, we collected data on all bills tabled at the first reading in the Chamber of Deputies over this period. To capture oversight activities, we opted to gather data on all oral questions and a random sample of written questions to the government, also submitted in the Chamber of Deputies. Both for bills and parliamentary questions, authorship was attributed on the basis of the party affiliation of the first signatory at the moment either the bill or the question were presented, i.e. we do not consider co-sponsorship of other parties’ bills. Each activity was coded by the authors working in pairs by attributing one of the 230 policy codes making up the Italian Policy Agendas codebook. These codes are clustered in 21 policy topic areas. Disagreements on topic assignment were discussed on a case-by-case basis. Figure 1 shows descriptive information on the three datasets.

**Analysis**

The first question we address is to what extent the overall issue profile of the 5SM differs from the one pursued by other opposition parties' in previous legislatures. To answer this question, we rely on a database containing the content coding of all parliamentary oral questions submitted on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies during question time since 1996 (Russo and Cavalieri, 2016). For each legislature and opposition party, we calculated the share of questions devoted to a specific topic (using one of the 230 subtopics making up the Italian codebook) and we compared it to the issue distribution of the 5SM in the 17th legislature. In order to measure the overall difference for each pair of issue profiles, we use issue convergence scores as developed by Sigelman and Buell (2004). This index sums the absolute differences in attention proportion for each of the issues included. The index goes from 0, when the distribution of attention diverges completely, to 1, indicating a perfect overlap between the two agendas. For instance, a value of 0.8 means that 80 per cent of the party agenda is similar to the agenda of the 5SM.

Figure 2 plots on the y-axis convergence scores and on the x-axis the position of other parties on the left (0) – right (10) dimension. The estimation of party position relied on expert surveys (data are drawn from www.parlgov.org). The plot reveals that the issue-attention profile of 5SM question time is equally closer to that of parties from the left- and right-side of the political spectrum. The highest convergence scores are with Italy of Values (IDV) in the 16th legislature (40.5%). Moreover, there is some overlap with the Democratic Party in the 14th legislature (37.3%), Communist Refoundation...
Party in the 13th legislature (36.3%) and Go Italy in the 13th legislature (35.6%). Vice versa the SSM differs the most from the Northern League (14.9%) and the Union/Centre (19.1%), both in the 15th legislature. Overall, the relationship between issue convergence and party position on the left-right axis is negative and statistically significant at a significance level close to 10% (P-value of 0.08, R-squared of 0.19). Although comparisons across time should be taken with caution since it is difficult to control for the impact of contingent external events (international crises, natural disasters etc.) and how parties differently react to them, two findings emerge. First, the SSM profile cross-cuts the left-right axis. Its MPs asks questions on matters relatively similar to the ones other mainstream parties with a credible aspiration to become majority (Go Italy and Democratic Party) asked in the past when they were on the opposition. Second, the biggest gap exists with smaller parties on the right and centre-right. These can be categorised as niche parties because of their narrower issue focus and low emphasis on economic-related subjects (Bischof, 2015; Wagner, 2012). These five parties tended to concentrate their attention on a smaller number of issues (on average 33), whereas the average of the pool of parties is 57. A case in point is the Northern League which, especially in the last two legislatures (15th and 16th) has traditionally focused its question time on topics such as immigration, regionalism and security. On the other hand, the proximity between the SSM and the IDV comes as no surprise given that both are protest parties sharing a ‘populist/anti-party elite’ discourse. In 2009 Grillo expressed his support for two independent candidates in the IDV lists in the European elections (http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/03/comunicato_poli_14.html).

The second step in our analysis envisages a comparison between the SSM and other opposition parties’ issue focus in the 17th legislature. Figure 3 uses data on both legislative initiative and parliamentary questioning. For both activities, it selects the 10 most frequent topics addressed by the SSM and shows the share of attention devoted by the SSM (triangle) and on average by the other three main opposition parties (circle). The start and end of the dashed line around the circle represent the opposition party with respectively the lowest and highest attention share. The figure inside parentheses next to the topic label is the ranking of the topic in the SSM manifesto. The SSM party platform at the national 2013 election was divided into sentences and each sentence was coded with the same policy content coding system used for parliamentary activities. Next, we ranked topics based on the share of attention in the party platform from highest to lowest.

The first finding to note is that “government operations” and “environment” are among the top-ranked issues for all activities. The former is a rather heterogeneous category including political, institutional and public administration issues as well as scandals and corruption connected with public offices. The
SSM stands out from the rest of parties especially when it comes to oral questions. For the most part, this emphasis is driven by SSM’s populist attacks against the so-called "political caste": one-fifth of the questions (n=18) challenge government appointments to public offices; 16% (n=13) question the executive conduct from a political and legal perspective; finally, 13% (n=10) call for institutional reforms, such as the reform of the electoral law or the regulation of party financing. With its 41 questions, the SSM is clearly leading other parties (FI=11, LN=3, SEL=14) when it comes to anti-elites topics. Another signature issue for the SSM is clean energy and environment. In this case, the distance from other parties is even more apparent. It is especially noteworthy because of the presence in parliament of another opposition party with a strong environmental identity, SEL.

Other issues receive much attention in the party platform but rank lower in terms of issue attention in parliamentary activities. For instance, health and communication policies are respectively the first and fourth in the ranking of manifesto issues but they did not attract as much attention in the course of the parliamentary mandate. Finally, comparatively less attention than other parties was devoted to “Justice & Crime”. The SSM could not entirely “disregard” the issue (which is only 14th in its manifesto) because of its centrality in the public debate and because it would have meant surrendering the power of framing the issue to other parties.

All in all, there are no remarkable differences between the issue profiles in bills and parliamentary questions. If for each topic, we subtract the average of other parties from the SSM value and, by type of activity, we compute the mean of these values, the difference between the two means is not statistically significance at conventional levels.

These findings come as no surprise when looked at from a party issue competition perspective. The issue profile of the bills and questions tabled by the SSM reflects what we know about the issues “owned” by the party. All parties devote some attention to “State operations” but the anti-elitism of the SSM makes it even more salient. On the other hand, also how other parties allocate attention is taken into consideration (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). Although SSM MPs would theoretically prefer to focus exclusively on issues that are advantageous to them, they cannot entirely avoid issues “owned” by their opponents. An emblematic case is “Justice & Crime” which is a signature issue for the Northern League and Go Italy. From an issue competition perspective, the SSM does not seem to behave differently from other parties.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The final section of our analysis looks at the temporal interaction between the SSM agenda and that of other opposition parties. More specifically, it asks whether: there is evidence that the allocation of attention of the SSM at time t is partially driven by the other opposition parties’ agendas at time t-1;
whether and to what extent other party opposition agendas are influenced at time t by the attention profile of the SSM at time t-1. There is no optimal expected time lag before a party reacts to another’s change in issue attention. We applied a one-month interval because a shorter time lag would lead to an inflation of zeros in some categories. Furthermore, it fits with the expected drafting time for legislative bills. A total of 8 models were computed: the dependent variables are the monthly agendas of the four opposition parties computed by using the share of issue attention in either bills or oral questions. The covariates are the separate agendas of other parties in the previous month, once again measured using either bills or questions. We also include a lagged dependent variable because we expect the current agenda composition to be heavily influenced by its past level (especially for oral questions, since opposition parties tend to prolong their issue attention for longer than governing parties, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). To take into account the interdependence between attention shares across topics and across time, we ran a linear regression model with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995).

Table 1 and 2 reports the results respectively for bills and oral parliamentary questions. Columns list the dependent variables, party agendas at time t. Rows list the party agendas in the previous month (t-1). A positive and statistically significant coefficient entails that there is evidence that party x at time t modified its attention for topic i in response to other parties’ activities in the same area. The relatively low R-squared coefficients signal that our models account for a small portion of the total variability. In other words, the weight of what other parties do in the past has only little consequence for how parties form their agenda.

The answer to our first question, who influences the SSM agenda, differs between the two types of activities. As regards bills, whereas the SSM shows sensitivity to increases in attention in the agendas of Go Italy and the Northern League, it does not seem to react to SEL legislative activity. On the contrary, its attention during question time is partly driven only by previous questions made by SEL. These results lend themselves to various interpretations. On the one hand, it seems that the SSM does not want to surrender ownership over specific issues to right-wing parties in the realms of legislative proposals. A 1% increase in attention for topic i by either one of the two parties at time t-1 is associated with an average increase of 0.1 in SSM’s attention at time t. On the other hand, there appears to be some sort of informal coordination with SEL, whereby the two parties do not introduce proposals on similar topics close in time and, when there is the opportunity to attack the cabinet during question time on favourable common issues, they tend to unite their voices so as to maintain attention for longer periods of time.

Our second aim is to explore the impact of SSM’s issue attention over other parties. Remarkably we find that all parties but the Northern League react to variations in SSM attention, regardless of the type of activity under consideration. To say it differently, there is some evidence that the NL is the only
party not interested to challenge the ownership over SSM issues (see also Appendix 1 and 2). The distance between the two parties is further confirmed if we compute convergence scores (see above) between all combinations of opposition parties across the three type of activities. Remarkably, the lowest average convergence score is reached by the pair SSM-NL (46.6%).

Conclusions

About five years after the 2013 elections, the SSM still remains an unidentified object in the Italian and European political landscape. This research paper tries to cast some light on its behaviour in parliament by focusing on the policy content of its activities. We argued that an "issue" perspective allows bringing to the surface a rather unexplored side of the SSM’s agenda-setting strategy, given that most studies analysed its communication style.

Our research approach was mostly inductive, a choice justified – among other things – by the relative lack of research on the institutional side of SSM’s activities. On the other hand, our analyses were always based on comparisons. First, we set out a comparison with the thematic profile of past opposition parties (starting from the 13th legislature) during question time. We found that the issue focus of the SSM cross-cuts the left-right divide, thus confirming Grillo's portrait of the Movement as "post-ideological". On the other hand, it differs the most from small parties of the centre and right characterised by a narrow issue focus. This substantiates previous studies showing that the identity of the SSM parliamentarians is "ideologically much closer to the left on both socio-economic and socio-cultural issues" (Farinelli and Massetti, 2015: 222).

Our second comparison uses data on the policy content of three types of parliamentary activities (oral questions, written questions and bills) and contrasts the issue focus of the movement with that of the other three main opposition parties. Results reveal that the SSM stands out for its stress on political-administrative and environmental issues. In particular, it has a tendency to lead the debate on the reform of political institutions and the fight of corruption and on clean energy and recycling. These issues figure prominently in its party manifesto. Vice versa, the only issue category where it lags behind all other parties is “law and order”. All in all, we can conclude that the agenda profile of the SSM does not differ substantially from that of other parties. Despite the virulent rhetoric of its spokespersons who use all opportunities to take the distance from the “despicable” parliamentary caste, the evidence shows that SSM MPs progressively internalised parliamentary norms into their daily routine, making them almost indistinguishable from other parties.
Our final section looks at the interaction between the agenda of opposition parties. In particular, we ask to what extent the attention focus of 5SM follows other parties’ agendas and, on its turn, to what extent its attention focus is followed by others. As regards bills introduction, we find that the 5SM tends to react to the activity of right-wing parties (FI and NL). On the contrary, if the left-wing SEL tables many bills on topic i at time t-1, it does not trigger a response of the 5SM the next month on the same topic. Two explanations are possible. On the one hand, the effect could be more immediate than a month. On the other, a silent agreement may exist whereby the two parties support each other’s bills and do not introduce bills on similar topics close in time. Testing this hypothesis would require access to voting data and should be the focus of more research in the future. The analysis of oral questions to the government brings further evidence in support of the proximity of agenda-setting strategies between SEL and the 5SM. Besides maintaining topic attention over its own favourable issues from the previous months (as other opposition parties do except for FI), it follows (and it is followed by) SEL. Finally, we find some evidence in support of the view that the 5SM is an agenda-setter for both the left and the centre-right, since (no matter the instrument considered) it influences both FI and SEL. On the other hand, our results emphasise the distance between the agenda of the Northern League and the 5SM. Despite sharing a similar Eurosceptic position, their thematic profiles are the most different in our pool of opposition parties.

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References


