

The background of the cover is a complex architectural floor plan in white lines on a dark teal background. It features various rooms, corridors, and structural elements, including a large curved area with a grid of small circles, possibly representing a stadium or a large public space. The lines are thin and precise, creating a technical and geometric aesthetic.

NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY LANDSCAPES IN MORALITY AND EMOTION

Sara Graça da Silva

ROUTLEDGE



† New Interdisciplinary Landscapes in Morality and Emotion

The intersection between morality and emotion is not always easily discernible. Researchers often choose to treat these concepts separately, and in doing so an important aspect of this symbiosis is irremediably thwarted. *New Interdisciplinary Landscapes in Morality and Emotion* considers the relationship between these fields, reflecting on complex philosophical, psychological, social, evolutionary, historical and literary approaches.

The book reviews emerging paths and features contributions from distinct scientific fields, including highly debated and somewhat controversial topics such as the relationship between empathy and in-group biases; emotion and irrationality; reflexivity and meta-emotions; shame and pro-social behaviour; the evolution of human jealousy; the role of love in driving moral motivation; individuals' wellbeing; behavioural economics; social robotics; historical considerations of medical societies and politics of sadism; and literary reflections on sympathy and emigration.

Covering various methodological angles and entanglements, *New Interdisciplinary Landscapes in Morality and Emotion* will appeal to anyone interested in multidisciplinary dialogues from across the humanities, sciences and the social sciences.

Sara Silva is a Postdoctoral Researcher at IELT – Institute for the Study of Literature and Tradition, NOVA FCSH, Lisbon, Portugal.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

New Interdisciplinary Landscapes in Morality and Emotion

Sara Graça da Silva

First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Sara Graça da Silva; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Sara Graça da Silva to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Silva, Sara Graça da, editor.

Title: New Interdisciplinary Landscapes in Morality and Emotion / [edited by] Sara Graça da Silva.

Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017054791 (print) | LCCN 2017059050 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781315143897 (Paperback) | ISBN 9781138500594 (hardback)

Subjects: LCSH: Ethics—Psychological aspects. | Emotions. | Moral development.

Classification: LCC BJ45 (ebook) | LCC BJ45 .M674 2018 (print) | DDC 155.2/5—dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2017054791>

ISBN: 978-1-138-50059-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-14389-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Goudy

by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

<i>Note on contributors</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
Introduction: Morality and emotion, or why “this is a very complicated case, you know, a lot of ins, a lot of outs, a lot of what-have-you’s . . .”	1
SARA GRAÇA DA SILVA	
1 Empathy and the moral self	12
JESSE PRINZ	
2 Emotions and irrationality	27
VASCO CORREIA	
3 Situations, emotions and character within a situated approach to emotions	41
DINA MENDONÇA	
4 Driven by shame: how a negative emotion may lead to prosocial behaviour	52
AUGUSTA GASPAR AND MARIANA HENRIQUES	
5 Jealousy: evolutionary, cultural and moral perspectives	67
LUDWIG KRIPPAHL	
6 Morality and what’s love got to do with it	82
KATRIEN SCHAUBROECK	
7 What makes a good society? Happiness and the role of contextual and psychological factors	96
CATARINA RIVERO AND CHRISTIN-MELANIE VAUCLAIR	

8	Morality as emotions in process: neuropsychanalysis, behavioural economics and global citizenship	110
	ÂNGELA LACERDA NOBRE	
9	Towards more humane machines: creating emotional social robots	125
	ANA PAIVA, SAMUEL MASCARENHAS, SOFIA PETISCA, FILIPA CORREIA, AND PATRÍCIA ALVES-OLIVEIRA	
10	The “hydrologist’s weapons”: emotions and the moral economy of internationalism, 1921–1952	140
	ILARIA SCAGLIA	
11	Neville Heath and the politics of sadism in mid-twentieth-century Britain	153
	JOANNA BOURKE	
12	“The moral muddle about murder”: the decrease in sympathy for the murder victim in late Victorian detective fiction	165
	MARJOLEIN PLATJEE	
13	“The feelings, and revealings, and memories of Home!”: emigration and the primrose	178
	RUTH BRIMACOMBE	
	<i>Index</i>	193

Contributors

Patrícia Alves-Oliveira is a PhD student at ISCTE-IUL in the field of psychology applied to human–robot interactions. Prior to her PhD, Patrícia was involved in the study of empathy in robots and how the empathic capabilities embedded in robotic agents can foster and influence learning amongst children. Patrícia has worked as a researcher in the EU FP7 EMOTE project, developing an empathic robotic tutor aimed at supporting children in the acquisition of curricular topics. In her PhD, Patrícia is studying how we can use robots to boost creativity. More specifically, she is interested in how robots can be used to stimulate creative abilities in children and ultimately contribute to a new generation of children that can more easily adapt to creative and innovative societies.

Joanna Bourke is Professor of History at Birkbeck, University of London, and Fellow of the British Academy. She is the prize-winning author of twelve books, including histories on modern warfare, military medicine, psychology and psychiatry, the emotions and rape. Among others, she is the author of *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain, and the Great War* (1996), *An Intimate History of Killing* (1999), *Fear: A Cultural History* (2005) and *Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present* (2007). Her book *What It Means to Be Human: Reflections from 1791 to the Present* was published by Virago in 2011. In 2014, she was the author of *The Story of Pain: From Prayer to Painkillers* (OUP) and *Wounding the World: How Military Violence and War-Play Are Invading Our Lives* (Virago). Her books have been translated into Chinese, Russian, Spanish, Catalan, Italian, Portuguese, Czech, Turkish and Greek.

Ruth Brimacombe is an independent scholar who formerly worked for the National Portrait Gallery in London as Collections Curator – 19th Century. She was awarded her doctorate in art history from the University of Melbourne in 2008 for a study entitled *Imperial Avatars: Art, India and the Prince of Wales 1875–6*. Her thesis explored the work of the artist-reporters and photographers who accompanied the Prince of Wales (later Edward VII) on his royal tour of India in the late nineteenth century. She recently contributed a chapter on the subject to a collected book of essays titled *Virtual Victorians: Networks, Collections, Technologies* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and has

co-curated an online exhibition titled *Picturing the News: The Art of Victorian Graphic Journalism* with Professor Cathy Waters at the University of Kent (launched February 2017).

Filipa Correia received an MSc in Computer Science from the University of Lisbon, Portugal, 2015. She is currently pursuing a PhD in Human–Robot Interaction and Artificial Intelligence applied to games at the University of Lisbon, Portugal, and is a teaching assistant in the courses of Artificial Intelligence and Multi-Agent Systems.

Vasco Correia received his PhD from the Paris-Sorbonne University with a dissertation on “Self-Deception and the Problem of Irrationality”. He is currently a research fellow at the Nova Institute of Philosophy (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), where he develops a project on the topic of cognitive biases in argumentation and decision making. He is the author of *La duperie de soi* (2010), *La pensée irrationnelle* (2016) and numerous papers on the topics of rationality, cognitive biases and the philosophy of mind.

Augusta Gaspar is an Assistant Professor and the Pedagogical Director of the Undergraduate program in Psychology at the Catholic University of Portugal. She is also a full researcher at the CIS – Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social at ISCTE-IUL – Lisbon University Institute. At ISCTE-IUL, she teaches and coordinates interdisciplinary undergraduate and graduate courses (bridging psychology, biology and anthropology) and is principal researcher at CRC-W, Católica Research Center for Psychological, family and Social Wellbeing, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa, Portugal. Her research addresses the ontogeny and evolution of empathy, morality and the behavioural expression and physiological correlates of emotion. Her work has been published in international and national peer-reviewed journals and proceedings. Examples of books where she has published chapters are *Personality and Temperament in Nonhuman Primates*, edited by Alexander Weiss, James King and Alison Murray (2011, Springer-Verlag) and *The Evolution of Social Communication in Primates: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Marco Pina and Nathalie Gonthier (2014, Springer -Verlag).

Mariana Henriques holds a Masters in Psychology of Emotions from ISCTE-IUL and a Bachelor in Management from Nova School of Business and Economics. Her master’s thesis on the role of individual differences in shame-induced behaviour has been presented at the VIII National Psychology Research Symposium in Aveiro (June 2013). Mariana has also participated in a nationally funded research project at CIS – Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social at ISCTE-IUL – Lisbon University Institute, coordinated by Augusta Gaspar and focusing on inter-individual differences in emotional empathy. Her research interests include morality, empathy and emotions and how these interact with individual differences and situational factors. Mariana currently works in the technology industry driving innovation and digital transformation programs in companies of all sizes.

Ludwig Krippahl obtained his PhD in structural biochemistry from Universidade Nova de Lisboa in 2003, with a thesis on the integration of protein structural information. He is an assistant professor at the Computer Science Department of Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia/UNL and a researcher at the NOVA-LINCS computer science centre. His main research interests bridge machine learning and bioinformatics. His teaching experience includes bioinformatics, machine learning and critical thinking, and he has always been interested in the interface between biology, cognition and informatics.

Samuel Mascarenhas is currently a post-doctoral researcher at GAIPS, INESC-ID, in Lisbon, Portugal. In 2015 he received his doctoral degree in Information Systems and Computer Engineering from the Instituto Superior Técnico (IST), University of Lisbon in Portugal. His research interests are in artificial intelligence, culture, affective computing, virtual agents and socio-cognitive sciences. In his PhD, he studied the integration of cultural aspects in virtual agents to improve their ability to act with other humans in social contexts. As a developer/researcher in two EU-funded projects (eCircus and eCute), he applied the work of his PhD in the development of two serious games for raising intercultural awareness (ORIENT and TRAVELLER). His participation focused on the creation of characters whose artificial intelligence follows a flexible model of socio-cultural biases. He was also an active member of two other EU-funded projects, LIREC and SEMIRA.

Dina Mendonça is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Philosophy at the Instituto de Filosofia da Nova, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. After a Masters in Philosophy for Children under the supervision of Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, she took her Doctoral Degree at the University of South Carolina with a dissertation on “The Anatomy of Experience – An Analysis of John Dewey’s Concept of Experience”. She is currently working on a situated approach to emotions, a novel and ground-breaking account that takes emotions as dynamic and active situational occurrences (Mendonça 2012) and explores and identifies further complexities of our emotional world in numerous papers. Recently she has been expanding the application of this perspective to argumentation theory and ethics. In addition to her research work in philosophy of emotion, she promotes and creates original material for application of philosophy as an aid in the creative processes to all schooling stages.

Ângela Lacerda Nobre, born in Lisbon in 1960, has an academic background in nursing and economics, has a master in applied economics, a master in philosophy and psychoanalytical training, and a PhD in management and information system streams (Semiotic Learning: A Conceptual Framework to Facilitate Learning in Knowledge-Intensive Organisations). A. L. Nobre has professional experience as a nurse and as an economist; she has been working at a management school (www.esce.ips.pt) since 1998 and has published her research in the areas of semiotics, psychoanalysis, practical philosophy, knowledge management and organisational learning.

Ana Paiva is a Full Professor in the Department of Computer Engineering at Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) from the University of Lisbon and Coordinator of GAIPS – “Intelligent Agents and Synthetic Characters Group” – at INESC-ID. She has founded and leads the GAIPS research group at INESC-ID (<http://gaips.inesc-id.pt/gaips/>). The group investigates the creation of complex systems using an agent-based approach, with a special focus on social agents. Professor Paiva is recognised worldwide for her contributions in the areas of virtual agents, multi-agent systems, social robotics and affective computing. She has coordinated the participation of INESC-ID and IST in more than 20 European and national research projects in the areas of her expertise, edited six books and published more than 200 papers in scientific journals and conferences. Her main research focuses on the problems and techniques for creating agent-based systems (both virtual and robotic) that can simulate human behaviour or establish natural interactions with humans.

Sofia Petisca took a master’s degree in Psychology of Emotions in 2013 at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), and since 2014 she has been working in the field of human–robot interactions at GAIPS and INESC-ID, having been part of the EU FP7 EMOTE project. Recently, she has started her PhD with the topic of morality in human–robot interactions, with the aim to understand how can we better equip our social robots to promote more honest behaviours from people.

Marjolein Platjee is a doctoral student with the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis at the University of Amsterdam. Her dissertation focuses on representations of the dying and dead body in British Victorian literature and culture. Having developed a particular interest in popular fiction, her thesis includes a variety of popular genres such as penny bloods, as well as sensation and detective fiction. She has recently contributed to *The Companion to Victorian Popular Literature* which will be published by McFarland Publishing & Co.

Jesse Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of Interdisciplinary Science Studies at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. His research focuses on the perceptual, emotional and cultural foundations of human psychology. He is author of *Furnishing the Mind* (2002), *Gut Reactions* (Oxford, 2004), *The Emotional Construction of Morals* (2007), *Beyond Human Nature* (2012) and *The Conscious Brain* (2012). Two other books are forthcoming: *The Moral Self and Works of Wonder* and *Emotions, Morality, and Identity: An Empirical Approach*.

Catarina Rivero is a Clinical Psychologist, Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon, with training in Family Therapy by the Portuguese Association of Family and Community Therapy. She holds a Masters in Family and Systems Therapy (Faculty of Medicine of the University of Seville) and an Executive Master on Applied Positive Psychology (Lisbon University). She is president of the Portuguese Association of Studies and Intervention in Positive Psychology (APEIPP) and a member of the Portuguese Association of Family and

Community Therapy. She co-authored the book *Positiva-Mente* (2011) and *Manual of Collaborative and Positive Practices in Social Intervention* (2013). She works as a psychotherapist and collaborates with several entities as a trainer. She is an invited professor at the Piaget Institute. Currently, she is concluding her master's thesis on society, risk and health (Lisbon University), where she is relating income inequality, institutional trust, wellbeing and depression in European citizens.

Ilaria Scaglia is Assistant Professor of Asian and International History in the Department of History and Geography at Columbus State University. She is also the recipient of a Volkswagen-Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship for Research in Germany. In 2016–2017, she was affiliated with the Dahlem Humanities Center and the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University Berlin, and she is also a Visiting Researcher at the Center “History of Emotions” at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. She is the author of “The aesthetics of internationalism: Culture and politics on display at the 1935–1936 International Exhibition of Chinese Art”, *Journal of World History*, 26(1), March 2015, 105–137. She is currently working on a project exploring the interplay of emotions and internationalism, focusing on institutions active in the Alps in the 1920s and 1930s.

Katrien Schaubroeck is tenure track lecturer at the Philosophy Department of the University of Antwerp. She has published on normative reasons, moral responsibility, morality and love. She is the author of *The Normativity of What We Care About. A Love-Based Reason Theory* (2013, Leuven University Press). Together with Esther Kroeker she edited *Love, Reason and Morality* (2017, Routledge). At the moment she supervises the PhD project “The Ethics of Love: (How) Ought Parents and Children to Love Each Other?” financed by the Special Research Fund of the University of Antwerp.

Sara Graça da Silva received her PhD from Keele University in 2008 with a thesis on the rich interplay between nineteenth-century science and literature: ‘Sexual Plots in Charles Darwin and George Eliot: Evolution and Manliness in Adam Bede and The Mill on the Floss’. Her main research interests include the relationship between science and literature, Darwinism and evolutionary theories, gender studies, the application of phylogenetic methodologies to the study of human cultural diversity and morality. She is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute for the Study of Literature and Tradition, New University of Lisbon, Portugal, working on evolutionary readings of folktales. She has contributed to the *Victorian Literature Handbook*, *Dictionary of Nineteenth Century Journalism*, *Utopian Studies*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Royal Society Open Science, PNAS and Routledge, amongst others.

Christin-Melanie Vauclair is a cross-cultural psychologist and research fellow at ISCTE-IUL's Centre for Psychological Research and Social Intervention (CIS-IUL) in Lisbon. One of her academic specialisations is the psychology of morality across cultures. In 2004, she received an MSc in social psychology

from the University of Regensburg (Germany) studying intercultural contact. In 2011, she completed her PhD at the Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research at Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand) examining moral attitudes and values across cultures. She then studied issues of stereotyping and discrimination across cultures at the University of Kent (UK) as a post-doctoral fellow. She was granted a four-year Marie Curie Fellowship to continue this line of research at CIS-IUL. She is currently an FCT research fellow continuing her work on cultural aspects of morality and stereotyping. Vauclair publishes in the leading scholarly journals across different disciplines and has received several awards for her work.

Acknowledgments

The colloquium on morality and emotion which I organise annually with IELT – Institute for the Study of Literature and Tradition – at the New University of Lisbon has now become a tradition every October. This second book is inspired by the latest editions of the meeting, and includes chapters by keynote speakers at the event and other invited contributors. I am greatly indebted to the Morality and Emotion team, to IELT and to The Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) for their support.

The number of chapters almost doubled in size in comparison with the previous book, which is a testament to the ever-growing and ebullient interest these topics originate. My most sincere thanks to all the contributors for their enlightening studies, patience and cooperation. Thank you also to the editors at Routledge for their professionalism and understanding during all the phases of the process, especially Ceri Griffiths, Anna Cuthbert, Hannah Kingerlee, and Kate Fornadel.

As always, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family, Alberto Augusto Oliveira da Silva, Maria Anita Marinho Graça and Rita Graça da Silva, for their daily encouragement, knowledge and creativity. And love.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Introduction

Morality and emotion, or why “this is a very complicated case, you know, a lot of ins, a lot of outs, a lot of what-have-you’s . . .”

Sara Graça da Silva

What is it?

When studying emotions and morality, this is the question everyone wants an answer for. However, this is also the question no one truly interested in knowing what they mean should ever ask. There are just too many *ins* and *outs*. Trying to reduce either of these two concepts to a single definition is therefore reductive, misguided and even harmful. Whilst categorising morality and emotion as “it” might appear to make things easier at first glance, it is ultimately impossible. Just as individuals are composed of many layers, so do morality and emotion share multiple disciplinary standpoints, constraints and forms of significance, being incredibly fluid across time and space. A true grasp of this reciprocity can only be attained by a meaningful interchange of all of these paradigms. Moreover, neither is morality merely an abstract set of rules, nor is emotion simply a fixed set of mental expressions. So let’s stop acting as if they have to be, and instead direct our energy towards more interesting and answerable questions, including the way emotions and morals are regulated and manipulated (and the motivations behind these transactions). As the ensuing chapters will show, morality and emotion are mutually dependant and deeply indicative of specific cultural and social determinants which in turn influence the way we experience life and place value on the most varied cognitive and social phenomena, both consciously and unconsciously.

As with the previous book, the multidisciplinary framework of the present volume was specifically designed to explore these intersections in an intentionally provocative fashion, focusing on rampant and highly debated topics and research trends through an unusual but carefully intertwined combination of chapters. These range from reflections on complex philosophical and psychological arguments; examinations of the role emotions (both negatively and positively charged) play in shaping our needs as citizens; considerations on contemporary practical and empirical approaches on the best ways to participate and cooperate in intimate social relations; contemplations on technological enhancement of emotions and morals; historical discussions of emotions and moral deliberations; and literary and artistic perspectives that expose our understanding of ourselves and the other – an increasingly pressing and worrying theme in today’s society given the current state of affairs.

Most human primates are creatures of habit. We feel comfortable knowing where we stand with things, where we are going, at what time and, if possible, with whom – it makes us feel in control of our emotions and environment, and gives us a sense of security. We like to know what to expect and whom we can trust. The question of trust is an essential requirement for a healthy social life. However, trusting is not easy. We have a tendency to believe we always know best and that our opinion is always more sensible. In his book *Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite* (2010), Robert Kurzban argues that people often fail to see their own inconsistencies, leading us to believe that everyone else (but us) is phony. When elaborating on human behaviour, Kurzban also recognises that people use morality strategically in social environments, in both cooperative and competitive situations:

The very constitution of the human mind makes us massively inconsistent . . . the human mind consists of many, many mental processes, think of them as little programming subroutines, or maybe individual iPhone applications – each operating by its own logic, designed by the inexorable process of natural selection; and, further, that what you think and what you do depends on which process is running the show – your show – at any particular moment. Because which part of the mind is in charge changes over time, and because these different parts are designed to do very different things, human behavior is – and this shouldn't be a surprise – complicated.

(Kurzban, 2010, p. 4)

The proven volatility of our character is reflected in the ambivalent relationship we have with our emotions and moral codes, and impacts greatly on the decisions we make (or fail to make), as well as on the way we exert self-control. This particular inconsistency and subjectivity is something every discipline, from the purest neurosciences to aesthetics, have been trying to untangle. Over the last decades, there has been an explosion of studies aimed at better understanding the neurobiological basis of the interaction between cognitive and affective processes (Damásio, 1994, 2013; LeDoux, 2000; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007), including how we respond to emotional challenges, such as anxiety disorders or depression (Solomons et al., 2015; Heller et al., 2013). Other studies have suggested that we make different moral deliberations depending on whether we are judging something in our native language or in a foreign one. Recent research, for example, has found that reading stories in a foreign language made subjects judge actions as less wrong because it eliminated the gut-feeling level of processing and implied a more prolonged consideration (Geipel et al., 2015).¹ Other works have focused on the ability to read others' expressions, which is considered crucial to empathetic responses and Theory of Mind (ToM), that is, the capacity to understand and reflect on our and other's mental states (Decety et al., 2014; Wood et al., 2016; Baron-Cohen, 2017). Indeed, empathy is an unavoidable concept when considering moral judgment, altruism, cooperation and pro-social behaviour, and its study remains central to discussions about human and non-human primate social relations (Bekoff and Pierce, 2009; de Waal, 2010).

Nevertheless, as the previous volume showed, the hypothesis that empathy is necessary for moral deliberation has divided scholars into various camps, from Daniel Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis which argues that "empathic concern produces altruistic motivation" (Batson, 2010: 2), to contrary interpretations that hold that empathy is not necessarily needed for moral judgment and can even be potentially responsible for poor moral discernment (Prinz, 2011a: 228; see also Prinz, 2011b). Although Prinz is sceptical about the role empathy plays in moral action, he acknowledges the key role of emotions in his sentimentalist theory: "emotions co-occur with moral judgments, influence moral judgments, are sufficient for moral judgments, and are necessary for moral judgments, because moral judgments are constituted by emotional dispositions" (Prinz, 2006: 36). Haidt's intuitionist theory similarly identifies a particular set of emotions or "psychological *foundations* upon which cultures construct their moralities" (Haidt and Joseph, 2007: 386).

The study of empathy is particularly fascinating because of its shifting and controversial perspectives. Current theories, such as the ones proposed by Cecchetto and her colleagues, identify three major components of empathy: *motor* (involving mimicry of other's expressions), *affective* (concern for another's welfare) and *cognitive empathy*, which encompasses not only *fantasy*, that is, the "ability to imagine oneself into the feelings and actions of characters in books and movies", but also *perspective taking*, "the ability to adopt the psychological point of view of others" (Cecchetto et al., 2014: 2).² Recent studies have claimed that empathy does not drive our moral decisions. When investigating "the influence of empathy and alexithymia (lack of emotional awareness) on behaviour and emotional responses while participants performed a moral decision task", Cecchetto and Aiello found out that neither the first nor the latter affect moral decision: "empathy and alexithymia shaped emotional reactions to moral decisions, but did not bias moral choices" (Cecchetto et al., 2017: 2).

In his chapter, Jesse Prinz addresses the "dark side" of empathy, claiming that it "leads to favouritism, in-group bias and insensitivity to cases of injustice and situations of large-scale loss". He lists five concerns associated with empathetic behaviour, namely 1) potentiating preferential treatment; 2) being epistemically unreliable; 3) having certain moral lacunae; 4) running the risk of being politically exploited; and 5) suffering from motivational limitations. Rather than being a "design flaw", however, Prinz defends that these in-group biases are actually part of empathy's function as an "identity construct – a psychological capacity that functions to help assert and maintain a sense of self". Indeed, one of Prinz's core arguments is the recognition that morality and identity are deeply intertwined. This, he notes, explains why we like to associate with people who share moral codes similar to ours and distance ourselves from those towards whom we feel no moral connection. Prinz's chapter is especially thorough in providing a lengthy and informative literature review on the theme.

As a species, our humanity is the quality we pride ourselves most of. However, it is also the first alibi we use to justify our bad decisions or lack of self-control. Vasco Correia's chapter explores this boomerang effect by scrutinising how "affective states often compromise the rationality of people's judgments and decisions"

and providing an important discussion of the motivational (or emotional) biases that interfere with both theoretical and practical reasoning. According to Correia, this inconsistency often leads to undesirable outcomes, such as unrealistic optimism, prejudice, scapegoating, risk mismanagement, hasty generalisations and polarisation of opinion. When constructing his argument, Correia is nevertheless careful in stating that emotions can, at times, help to make better rational decisions. However, akin to Prinz's call for caution, he, too, recognises the power of emotions in aggravating existing biases and suggests strategies that might help to mitigate these inclinations, a process known as *debiasing*. Some of these strategies include “*cognitive debiasing*, which seeks to reduce biases by reforming the way people reason; and *contextual debiasing*, which seeks to reduce biases by imposing constraints on the contexts in which people reason”.

Debiasing is rarely straightforward. It depends on a number of factors and *situations* that Dina Mendonça examines in her chapter, and that attest to the reflexivity of emotions in “understanding the role of character in moral situations”. By reflexivity, Mendonça means the way people “feel about their feelings”. As she explains, it is important to differentiate between first and second-order emotions. The latter, designated as meta-emotions, can change the value of first-order emotions, ultimately modifying the emotional experience altogether. In her account, Mendonça gives the example of someone who hates his or her own jealous thoughts and feelings:

Someone who feels jealous may be angry about having these jealous thoughts, or sad, or feel righteous about having them. It is easy to point out that these different meta-emotions (anger, sadness, righteousness) about the first-order emotion of jealousy will give a very different take on the meaning of the first-order emotion and most likely impact the actions and attitudes of the person who feels it in different ways.

Granted, different people will react differently to the same *situation*, and even the same person can do so depending on the context, mood, age, etc. As with Prinz's and Correia's chapters, so does Mendonça's recognise that the value people place on things is highly dependent on social biases, character and education, raising relevant questions regarding ethics and morality.

The next three chapters steer the discussion in a slightly different direction by focusing on specific emotions. Drawing from insights from anthropology and psychology, Augusta Gaspar and Mariana Henriques examine a particular moral emotion – shame. According to recent research, shame increases pro-social behaviour by affecting the perception we have of ourselves and our identity. Again, the concept of identity proves integral to the coherence of the book. As they point out, to feel shame has the adaptive function of warning people that they may be shunned socially: “Shame has been postulated to motivate people to engage in socially valued behaviours that will protect or improve their social images and consequently grant them the acceptance of others and prevent loss of group membership”. Individuals worry about transmitting a positive image of

themselves to others, and they go to great lengths in order to protect this reputation. Gaspar and Henriques also observe that the study of shame has been galvanised over the past years, in that there has been a clear shift in research, moving from an unbalanced focus on its negative consequences (such as lack of empathy or transgression) to a realisation of its huge potential in fostering pro-social behaviour.

Another emotion whose study has been recalibrated through a more positive lens is jealousy. In agreement with Gaspar and Henriques's argument, Ludwig Krippahl also identifies the adaptive nature of this specific emotion by providing an evolutionary account of its importance, particularly in where mating strategies as a result of reproductive evolutionary pressures are concerned. According to Krippahl, the study of this emotion must move beyond traditional analyses of violent behaviour and its motivations to a wider examination of its impact on social, ethical and legal considerations (i.e., crimes of passion and honour killings). Because there is no agreement over whether jealousy consists of one emotion or rather a combination of emotions, Krippahl is meticulous in distinguishing jealousy from envy as they both deal with feelings of resentment:

The object of envy is something, quality or relation that another has and which the subject desires but is lacking. This leads to negative feelings against the person who has these desiderata, such as ill will or even hatred. The object of jealousy, on the other hand, is some relation with one party that the subject fears losing to another party.

He notes that whereas we feel envy for something that exists, jealousy "may be caused simply by the fear that the desired relation may be threatened". For example, he claims, "an individual may become jealous just from considering the possibility that their partner may flirt with someone else". Finally, he reinforces that an evolutionary perspective does not mean one must excuse violent behaviour. If anything, he argues, "the understanding of jealousy-motivated violence as part of conditional strategies aimed at reproduction can actually justify stronger condemnation".

Katrien Schaubroeck's chapter touches on a similar assessment, if only from a different angle – travelling from jealousy to love. Instead of dwelling on emotions traditionally seen as negatively charged, Schaubroeck chooses to focus on love and morality. As she explains, moral philosophers often overlook love because "they may think that love is not an emotion, or not an emotion relevant for (because even opposed to) the moral standpoint". Sharing preoccupations raised in the previous chapters, Schaubroeck is also interested in the ethical implications that may arise from the acknowledgment of love as an important source of moral motivation. She refers to several empirical studies by neuroscientists and developmental psychologists that suggest a relationship between love and moral sensitivity, such as Patricia Churchland (2011), who "reasons that since trust is connected to the hormones of oxytocin and vasopressin, which are essential to love, there must be a biological connection between love and our human

sociality, by extension our human morality”. However, not everything in the garden of love is rosy. There are, Schaubroeck notes, scholars who consider love to be too lasting to be an emotion, whereas others defend that it cannot be an emotion because it typically involves two people (Fisher, 1992; Scruton, 1986). Her reply to these criticisms accentuates, once more, the central role *identity* plays in this understanding: “our identity as moral agents is deeply bound up with our biological nature as human beings that love and need to be loved in return”.

This longing for positive experiences is also explored by Catarina Rivero and Christin-Melanie Vauclair in their chapter on *what makes a good society*. These two authors demonstrate how the promotion of the subjective wellbeing (SWB) of citizens is not only beneficial for the individual’s happiness, but also for society as a whole (Diener and Ryan, 2011; Veenhoven, 2011). SWB is, they explain, “usually conceptualised as consisting of a cognitive component (life satisfaction) and an emotional component (happiness or emotional wellbeing), and how individuals think they are doing on these two components”. Within this framework, *trust* is essential, especially, they argue, in the aftermath of serious economic crises. According to Rivero and Vauclair, enhancing trust and equality (namely income equality) should be a moral imperative for democratic societies. Anchoring their argument in various empirical studies, they show how promoting SWB bolsters, among other things, pro-social behaviour, productivity and the wish to engage socially, even keeping mental illness at bay. However, they are also careful to inform that although this necessity has been identified in public policies and governmental agendas, the actual application of these efforts varies widely depending on specific societal conditionings, as does the level of existing corruption.

The desire for a “better world and a more just society” is something that Ângela Lacerda examines in her chapter. She acknowledges that this effort “is itself an open process that includes learning, and also, the repetition or rejection of previously accepted norms”. Using insights from behavioural economics, Lacerda echoes Rivero and Vauclair’s recognition of the centrality of income equality to social progress, stating that “social injustice is the dark side of present progress . . . both a cause and a consequence of its own existence, as a self-organised vicious circle, which systematically feeds its own feedback loop”. Her discussion ascribes a central role to the potential of psychoanalysis in enabling individuals to acknowledge their frailties and in teaching them ways of dealing with these, but also by learning to apply those “positive attitudes and capabilities at work for the benefit of both the individual and its community of interests”. Lacerda understands morality as “emotions in process” and regards the latter as the impetus behind decision making. She concludes by acknowledging the need to rethink the essence of humanity itself in the wake of increasingly complex systems of global citizenship and technology.

I wonder how many times have we used the line “Who do you think I am? Do you think I am a machine or a robot?” to condone our flawed nature. Thanks to developments in the field of artificial intelligence and human–robot interaction, this “excuse” might have its days numbered. Already in the 1950s, researchers

applied the famous Turing tests to try to distinguish whether a person was engaging with a human or with a machine through text-based interactions.³ The incredible advances this field has sustained relatively recently make us dream about a reality where one does not need to go to Oz to be able to see a wizard give a tinman a heart. There is actually established research entitled “restricted-perception Wizard-of-Oz studies” in robotics (Sequeira et al., 2016). Researchers at the Human Robot Interaction Laboratory at Tufts University in Massachusetts, for example, have been teaching robots to say *no* if they feel their safety is jeopardised (Briggs and Scheutz, 2015). Again, the question of trust is central in these accounts and brings further implications to the field of machine ethics and human enhancement debates. In their chapter, Ana Paiva et al. touch upon these controversial issues and set out to explain how to build artificial empathy in social robots so these achieve some level of moral decision making.

Introducing a different turn in the argument, the following four chapters attest to the power of historical and literary narratives as privileged sources of information on the articulation of morality and emotion, including topics that permeated the preceding chapters, namely identity, trust and empathic responses. Ilaria Scaglia’s chapter examines how these feelings are more fervent in times of conflict and war. She chooses the interwar period (and beyond) to investigate a particular fascinating society – The International Society of Medical Hydrology (SIHM) – which “sought to engender feelings of friendship among doctors and scientists from various countries by arguing that their emotional connections would transfer from the professional to the political realm”. This society contributed to the implementation of a “moral economy” of cooperative internationalism, and its practitioners quickly understood the huge affective potential and benefits in creating bonds between people – colleagues and patients alike – bonds which, far from genuine, were, as Scaglia observes, “the result of careful crafting and management”.

Murderous crimes also enjoy enormous affective potential and appeal (Goldstein, 1999; Bartch and Mares, 2014; Vaughan and Greenwood, 2017). Bridging with Scaglia’s considerations on the importance of identity and belonging during the interwar period, Joanna Bourke’s chapter dissects the story of the murderous Neville Heath at a time when Britain was only just getting over the war. The return of young men, she notes, provoked feelings of unease and distrust for fear these traumatic events “had aroused latent instincts of cruelty and sadism”. Bourke focuses on Heath’s killing and mutilation of two women in 1946 and on the emotional reactions these sadistic murders incited. The sordid nature of these episodes prompted fierce debates on morality, sexual activity and legal responsibility. Her discussion is particularly informative in pointing out the difficulty in distinguishing and judging crimes perpetrated by sadists or by the insane, something that continues to raise strong disagreements in today’s legal and psychiatric systems. Curiously, as Bourke notes, the war also contributed to a “steep deterioration of female morality” which resulted in a tendency for blaming the victim. Women who were attacked and murdered received very little sympathy. Furthermore, she states how the copious media sensationalism the case enjoyed

eventually undermined a sense of Britishness that prided itself in being reserved, serene and placid by prompting embarrassing “displays of emotionalism”.

This decrease in sympathy for the murder victim in favour of the murderer is also the driving force behind Marjolein Platjee’s discussion. In her chapter, she compares two actual murder cases and their press reception with two literary narratives, Arthur Conan Doyle’s *A Study in Scarlet* (1887) and Fergus Hume’s *The Mystery of a Hansom Cab* (1886). Studies have shown that imaginative narratives have a capacity for creating empathetic responses (Mar, Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 2011; Johnson, 2012).⁴ Platjee argues that contrary to what might have been expected, the decline in sympathy for the victims in these stories (due to the fact that victims were seen as morally corrupted) did not result in the disintegration of social morality, but rather ended up by re-establishing social norms and values, attesting to the triumph of justice and the legal system (at least fictionally). The murderers were arrested for their crimes “even if the public fails to sympathise with a murder victim”.

Jonathan Gottschall has noted that we are storytelling animals (2012). Indeed, our capacity for creativity and imagination is unique as a species, and there is clear evidence to support an evolutionary view of aesthetics.⁵ Interestingly, neuroscientists have identified that aesthetic and moral judgments seem to share the same areas of the brain (Tsukiura, 2011; Wald, 2015). The last chapter of the present collection, by Ruth Brimacombe, explores the representational function of literature and art. It invites a profound reflection on how a particular narrative documentation, accompanied by a painting depicting the transportation of a blossoming British primrose to Australian shores, became emblematic of the colonial experience, eliciting the strongest emotional experiences, not only of nostalgia and homesickness, but also serving “as an emotional touchstone in the colonial imagination”. A single primrose. So fragile and yet so powerful in its ability to re-create the values of a nation, in this case, the British (in its political, religious, cultural, social and environmental fronts). It is absolutely enthralling to realise how such a simple object, a simple *it*, can carry such mighty symbolism and function as “as a coping mechanism” to help emigrants deal with and create new memories of home. A feeling so incredibly compelling today, still.

The way in which the concepts of morality and emotion have been “itified” across time and space by different societies (and academics) says a great deal about the beliefs of these communities and their overall perception of the world, be it of intolerance, hate, pain or acceptance, love, happiness or ecstasy. The varied array of proposed chapters in this volume is a testament to the incredible diversity of research carried out in the study of the topic and attests to the need to transcend rigid disciplinary boundaries. There are clear connecting threads between the chapters, linking core concepts of identity and self-perception, context and situation, trust and equality, value, citizenship and memory. Only an integrative analysis that encompasses various disciplinary angles and methodologies can disclose a more meaningful examination of this symbiosis, making it a less *complicated case*.

Notes

- 1 See Julie Seivy's *Language in Mind: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics* (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 2014). Also her "How morality changes in a foreign language", *Scientific American* (2016). www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-morality-changes-in-a-foreign-language [accessed March 19, 2017]. For more on gut reactions see Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2004.
- 2 See also Decety and Cowell, 2014.
- 3 Director Alex Garland's movie *Ex Machina* deals with these concepts in a very engaging way.
- 4 In the previous volume, I pointed out a study published in *Science* by David Kidd and Emanuele Castano (2013) that suggested that reading fiction improves the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in comparison to reading non-fiction.
- 5 As I already tackled in the last volume, many scholars have noted the importance of the visual and the image as crucial instigators of emotional responses. Neuroaesthetics, for example, is a relatively recent but promising field, galvanised by the pioneering research undertaken by the likes of Semir Zeki (1999), Anjan Chatterjee (2013) and Arthur Shimamura (2013).

References

- Baron-Cohen, S. (2017). "The eyes and window to the mind". *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, 174, 1.
- Bartsch, A., & Mares, M-L. (2014). "Making sense of violence: Perceived meaningfulness as a predictor of audience interest in violent media content". *Journal of Communication*, 64, 956–976.
- Batson, D. C. (2010). *Altruism in Humans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bekoff, M., & Pierce, J. (2009). *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Briggs, G., & Scheutz, M. (2015). "'Sorry, I can't do that': Developing mechanisms to appropriately reject directives in human-robot interactions". In *Artificial Intelligence for Human-Robot Interaction Symposium*.
- Cecchetto, C., Korb, S., Rumiati, R. I., & Aiello, M. (2017). "Emotional reactions in moral decision-making are influenced by empathy and alexithymia". *Social Neuroscience*, 1. doi:10.1080/17470919.2017.1288656
- Churchland, P. (2011). *Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Damásio, A. (1994). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
- Damásio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). "The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and neurobiological origins". *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 14(2), 143–152.
- de Waal, F. (2010). *The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society*. London: Souvenir.
- Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014a). "The complex relation between morality and empathy". *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 18(7), 337–339. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.04.008
- Decety, J., Skelly, L., Yoder, K. J., & Kiehl, K. A. (2014). "Neural processing of dynamic emotional facial expressions in psychopaths". *Social Neuroscience*, 9(1), 36–49. <http://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2013.866905>
- Diener, E., & Ryan, K. (2011). "National accounts for well-being for public policy". In S. I. Donaldson, M. Csikszentmihalyi, & J. Nakamura (Eds.), *Applied Positive Psychology*:

- Improving Everyday Life, Health, Schools, Work, and Society* (pp. 15–34). New York: Routledge.
- Fisher, H. (1992). *Anatomy of Love: A Natural History of Mating, Marriage and Why We Stray*. New York: Norton.
- Geipel, J., Hadjichristidis, C., & Surian, L. (2015). “How foreign language shapes moral judgment”. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 59, 8–17.
- Goldstein, J. (1999). “The attractions of violent entertainment”. *Media Psychology*, 1(3), 271–282. doi:10.1207/s1532785xmep0103_5
- Gottschall, J. (2012). *The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). “The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules”. *The Innate Mind*, 3, 367–392.
- Heller, A. S., Johnstone, T., Peterson, M. J., Kolden, G. G., Kalin, N. H., & Davidson, R. J. (2013). “Increases in prefrontal cortex activity when regulating negative emotion predicts symptom severity trajectory over six months in depression”. *JAMA Psychiatry*, 70(11), 1181–1189.
- Johnson, D. R. (2012). “Transportation into a story increases empathy, prosocial behavior, and perceptual bias toward fearful expressions”. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 52(2), 150–155.
- Kidd, David and Castano, Emanuele (2013). ‘Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind’, *Science*, 342 (6156): 377–380.
- Kurzban, R. (2010). *Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- LeDoux, J. E. (2000). “Emotion circuits in the brain”. *Annual Review of Neuroscience*, 23, 155–184.
- Mar, R. A. & Oatley, K. (2008). “The function of fiction is the abstraction and simulation of social experience”. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 3, 173–192.
- Oatley, K. (2011). “In the minds of others”. *Scientific American Mind*, 22(6), 62–67.
- Prinz, J. (2004). *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Prinz, J. (2006). “The emotional basis of moral judgments”. *Philosophical Explorations*, 9(1), 29–43.
- Prinz, J. (2011a). “Against empathy”. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 49 (Spindel Supplement), 214–233.
- Prinz, J. (2011b). “Is empathy necessary for morality?” In P. Goldie & A. Coplan (Eds.), *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives* (1971) (pp. 211–229). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Salomons, T. V., Nusslock, R., Detloff, A., Johnstone, T., & Davidson, R. J. (2015). “Neural emotion regulation circuitry underlying anxiolytic effects of perceived control over pain”. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 27(2), 222–233. ISSN: 0898-929X. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00702
- Scruton, R. (1986). *Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic*. New York: Free Press.
- Sequeira, P., Alves-Oliveira, P., Ribeiro, T., Di Tullio, E., Petisca, S., Melo, F. S., Castellano, G., & Paiva, A. (2016). “Discovering social interaction strategies for robots from restricted-perception wizard-of-Oz studies”. In *Human Robot Interacion* (pp. 197–204). New Zealand: HRI.
- Sevivy, Julie (2014). *Language in Mind: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics*. Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 2014.

- Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (ed.) (2007). *Moral Psychology Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tsukiura, T., & Cabeza, R. (2011, January). "Shared brain activity for aesthetic and moral judgments: Implications for the beauty-is-good stereotype". *Society for Cognitive Affective Neuroscience*, 6(1), 138–148. doi:10.1093/scan/nsq025.
- Vaughan, F., & Greenwood, R. M. (2017). "From the 'reel' world to the 'real' world: Subjective experiences of violent fictional entertainment". *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 1.
- Veenhoven, R. (2011). "Greater happiness for a greater number: Is that possible? If so, how?" In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing Positive Psychology: Taking Stock and Moving Forward* (pp. 396–409). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wald, C. (2015). "Neuroscience: The aesthetic brain". *Nature*, 526, S2–S3. doi:10.1038/526S2a
- Wood, A., Rychlowska, M., Korb, S., & Niedenthal, P. (2016). "Fashioning the face: Sensorimotor simulation contributes to facial expression recognition". *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 20(3), 227–240. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.12.010.