

WITTGENSTEIN, ANSCOMBE, AND WHAT CAN ONLY BE TRUE

Cora Diamond

Charlottesville, VA, USA

My talk concerns something that Anscombe took to be one of the main flaws in the *Tractatus*, that it excludes propositions that can only be true, apart from tautologies and mathematical propositions. My talk is an investigation of what the distance is, exactly, between Wittgenstein and Anscombe on this issue, taking into account Wittgenstein's early views and their later development.

MISLEADING PARALLELS. WITTGENSTEIN, ANALOGY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Alexandra Dias Fortes

Lisbon, Portugal

According to Wittgenstein, there are misunderstandings that emerge due to certain analogies in the forms of our language. Misleading parallels that are not recognized as such, are felt as problems by philosophers who are predisposed not to look at the actual use of our words.

Although "expressions constructed on analogical patterns" play an important role in human thought, they might also produce false appearances. In the hope of seeing how to overcome the confusions thus originated, I propose a brief overview of some of Wittgenstein's remarks that deal with this complex facet of analogies, similes, and a certain tendency for symmetry, characteristic of philosophical investigation when explanations are sought after that serve as a counterpart to what is open to view in our language games (for instance, the inclination to see the inner as what can complement the outer in a symmetric composition).

THE FRAMEWORK OF PERCEPTION

Jérôme Dokic

Paris, France

On a traditional epistemological picture, there can be only two kinds of explanations of the falsity of an ordinary perceptual judgment. The first kind of explanation is that the underlying perceptual experience itself is illusory and the subject has been misled in accepting its content as true. The second kind of explanation locates the problem at the level of erroneous background beliefs involved in the formation of the subject's judgment as further premises themselves in need of justification. The problem with the traditional picture is that the dichotomy between perceptual illusions and cognitive errors is not exhaustive. Ordinary perceptual knowledge also rests on "hinge propositions" (Wittgenstein 1969) or "primitive certainties" (Mulligan 2006), namely propositions that are taken for granted or presupposed in the formation of the perceptual judgement without being independently justified by background beliefs. Some of these propositions might be *false* without there being perceptual illusions or cognitive errors properly speaking. In this talk, I enquire into the nature of hinge propositions involved in ordinary perceptual knowledge, and suggest that the framework of perception is best thought in the context of an austere (vs liberal) theory of perceptual content.

„TENNIS OHNE BALL“: WITTGENSTEINS ARGUMENTATION GEGEN BEHAVIORISMUS UND MENTALISMUS

Tomáš Došek

Olomouc, Tschechische Republik

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit Wittgensteins Bezug zu Behaviorismus auf der Basis der Zurückweisung einer privaten Sprache. Seine Kritik an Mentalismus im Kontext von Privatsprachenproblem zeigt starke behavioristische Züge. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass dies jedoch nicht als eine hinreichende Bedingung für behavioristische Deutung von Wittgensteins Spätdenken gelesen werden kann. Mehr noch, ich möchte zeigen, dass Wittgensteins Position zu Behaviorismus dieselben argumentativen Züge aufweist, wie Kritik an Mentalismus und Introspektion. Als Schilderung von Wittgensteins Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus wird das Gedankenexperiment „Tennis ohne Ball“ interpretiert. Das Experiment wendet sich zwar primär gegen die Auffassung vom „inneren Sprechen“, ich werde jedoch zeigen, dass es ebenso plausibel für die Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus gedeutet werden kann. An diesem Beispiel möchte ich die Gemeinsamkeiten der Kritik an Mentalismus und Behaviorismus beleuchten.

MEANINGLESS BELIEFS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S "PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY – A FRAGMENT"

Matthew R. Dougherty

Blacksburg, VA, USA

In Section iv of his "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment" Wittgenstein seems to tell us that we do not believe that people have souls. This paper considers how we should understand his claim. It does so by applying the idea from throughout the Investigations that meaning is use. The conclusion reached is that Wittgenstein should be understood as claiming that statements of belief about the soul will only make sense in particular contexts, the lesson of which is that beliefs in general are not guaranteed to be ascribable across contexts and, so, do not fit our standard picture of them.

THE FACE-VALUE THEORY AND THE CONTENT OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

Dušan Dožudić

Zagreb, Croatia

Propositional attitudes are commonly treated as relations between agents and propositions and propositional attitude reports as stating precisely such relations. This is the basis of what Schiffer calls 'the face-value theory' of propositional attitude reports. A number of philosophers argued that such theory, as it stands, is untenable, or plainly false. Accordingly, they proposed various moderate or radical departures from it. In what follows I will discuss two such moderate departure, and argue that they do not avoid the very problem that their proponents took as the initial reason for departing from the face-value theory.

TWO TYPES OF BIOSEMANTIC REPRESENTATION

Christian Ebeling

Hamburg, Germany

Biosemantics as proposed by Ruth Millikan is explaining mental representations and meaning in the context of their evolutionary function. While the teleosemantic account